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EVALUATING REGULATORY MANAGEMENT TOOLS AND PROGRAMMES 
The OECD has rekindled the debate on measuring the performance of regulatory instruments and 
regulatory oversight institutions. This report presents and appraises indicators suitable for measuring 
the performance of smart regulation programs. These reform programmes cover the production and 
implementation of regulation across sectors, enhance governmental capacity to provide high-quality 
regulation, and are neutral to the total level of state intervention and regulatory activity. It 
distinguishes between various types of indicators situated at different points of regulatory policy: the 
Input to regulatory action, the Process of guiding regulators through requirements, the Output 
generated during a given period of time, the Intermediate outcomes such as behavioural and cognitive 
changes, and the Final outcomes. After having examined the usage of indicators in various OECD 
member states, the report appraises a large number of regulatory indicators by using a set of criteria, 
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FOREWORD 
OECD countries require better information about where investments in programs to improve 
regulations should be focused to pay growth and welfare dividends. This is necessary to target scarce 
resources for reform efforts, and also to communicate progress and generate the political support needed 
for implementing regulatory policy reforms. The work of the OECD‟s Regulatory Policy Committee on 
Measuring Regulatory Performance is intended to assist countries with the task of identifying this 
information through the development of measurement frameworks and the collection and interpretation of 
salient data (www.oecd.org/regreform/measuringperformance).  
The OECD is developing a framework for Regulatory Policy Evaluation to help countries evaluate the 
design and implementation of their regulatory policy against the achievement of strategic regulatory 
objectives (OECD, forthcoming). Its development has been informed by a series of three expert papers.  
This paper examines country practices for measuring the performance of regulatory policy, and 
develops options for a set of indicators that OECD countries can use for their regulatory policy evaluation. 
It appraises a large number of regulatory indicators by using a set of criteria, suggesting how and when 
they should be adopted, and for which purpose.  
It is the second paper in the OECD series of expert papers on Measuring Regulatory Performance. A 
first paper was prepared by Cary Coglianese, to discuss the attribution of changes in economic or welfare 
outcomes to changes in regulation and regulatory policy and suggest outcome indicators for regulatory 
policy. A third paper in the series was commissioned by the OECD from Professor David Parker, member 
of the UK regulatory policy committee and emeritus professor at Cranfield University and Professor Colin 
Kirkpatrick from the University of Manchester, to survey the literature on existing attempts at measuring 
the contribution of regulatory policy to improved performance (access the experts‟ papers on 
www.oecd.org/regreform/measuringperformance). 
This paper has been prepared by Claudio M. Radaelli (Professor of Political Science, Jean Monnet 
Chair in European Public Policy and Director of the Centre for European Governance, University of 
Exeter) and Oliver Fritsch (Associate Research Fellow, Centre for European Governance and Department 
of Politics, University of Exeter). It benefitted from the extensive comments of Christiane Arndt and 
Gregory Bounds at the OECD Regulatory Policy Division, information sent to the authors by the members 
of the Steering Group on Measuring Regulatory Performance, and the discussion of an early draft in an 
expert meeting in Madrid in 2011. Any remaining errors remain the authors‟ sole responsibility. 
The project of developing a framework for Regulatory Policy Evaluation has also been directly 
supported by the Government of Canada, which in 2011 provided a financial contribution to the project, 
and by the Government of Spain, which hosted an expert workshop on Measuring Regulatory Performance 
in Madrid on 26-27 September 2011. Overall the work has benefitted from the active engagement of the 
steering group on Measuring Regulatory Performance, which has had an advisory role in the project. The 
steering group is an ad hoc body of delegates to the Regulatory Policy Committee. 
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The OECD Regulatory Policy Committee 
The mandate of the Regulatory Policy Committee is to assist members and non-members in building 
and strengthening capacity for regulatory quality and regulatory reform. The Regulatory Policy Committee 
is supported by staff within the Regulatory Policy Division of the Public Governance and Territorial 
Development Directorate. For more information please visit www.oecd.org/regreform. 
The OECD Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate‟s unique emphasis on 
institutional design and policy implementation supports mutual learning and diffusion of best practice in 
different societal and market conditions. The goal is to help countries build better government systems and 
implement policies at both national and regional level that lead to sustainable economic and social 
development.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
This report provides an analysis and assessment of indicators of regulatory quality. The focus is on 
policy instruments and oversight activities that (a) cover the production and implementation of regulation 
across sectors rather than disciplining individual domains, (b) enhance governmental capacity to provide 
high-quality regulation (e.g. consultation, access to regulation, transparency), and (c) are neutral in relation 
to the total level of regulatory activity. The main aim of the report is to finalise a set of regulatory 
indicators for discussion in the OECD steering group on Measuring Regulatory Performance. The report 
does not describe how instruments and oversight institutions affect economic performance – this is the 
subject of a companion paper to be delivered by Professor Cary Coglianese.
1
 
At the outset, the report distinguishes the following steps in the causal chain of regulatory reform (a) 
the input – such as organising human and financial resources for smart regulation; (b) the process (or 
system) that allows the inputs to connect and operate; (c) the output refers to the activities carried out in a 
given period, such as how many consultations or impact assessment took place in a year, whether 
individual consultations match the quality standards set in the system, and so on; (d) intermediary 
outcomes cover behavioural and cognitive change, considering among other things how citizens and the 
business community perceive the regulatory efforts of the government. The final outcomes show the 
impact of smart regulation on economic indicators. 
The report finds that there are many indicators used for large-scale descriptions and comparisons. 
More often than not, these indicators do not provide information useful to policymakers in order to change 
the regulatory reform instruments they control. The OECD has gathered a coherent set of system-level 
indicators. The report considers that the systemic level is well taken-care of by these indicators. However, 
governments have been less active in adopting output and intermediary outcome indicators. The final set of 
indicators of economic outcomes is only mentioned in this paper.
2
 The report argues that input indicators 
are relatively easy to gather, but more conceptual effort is needed in identifying output and intermediary 
outcome indicators and how they should be used.  
Section 2 provides original data on how some OECD countries collect and utilise regulatory 
indicators. The experience is still limited and skewed. Limited because there is a lot of information in the 
regulatory management systems that is not collected systematically as indicators. Skewed because 
measurement has focused on some instruments and domains of regulatory reform, especially the cost of 
complying with administrative obligations, and has ignored other instruments and areas.  
Section 3 addresses the question: How should governments approach the design and of indicators? 
We suggest a re-calibration from burdens to the wider concept of regulatory costs: from the „cost‟ side (of 
the regulatory equation) to the „benefit-cost‟ perspective; from limited aspects of perceptions measured on 
firms to perceptions of regulatory effectiveness measured on firms, citizens and regulators; from the 
exclusive emphasis on regulatory instruments or tools to the joint consideration of tools and oversight 
structures; from the economic dimension to wider dimensions, including rights, inter-temporal efficiency 
and sustainability; and finally from production to usage of indicators. 
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The report then examines individual regulatory indicators in two modes, i.e. descriptive and 
evaluative. After having considered the two modes, we suggest whether a given indicator should be 
adopted or not. Taken together, the indicators provide a control panel for regulatory management. The 
panel can be used to obtain information on the overall performance (instruments and oversight structures) 
or to focus on particular tools. Obviously, the greatest advantages of the control panel come from using it 
across the years, with the data gathered in year 1 as baseline to measure progress over time. Comparison 
across countries is limited to some indicators and in any case comparisons should be sensitive to the 
different institutional and policy context of rulemaking and lawmaking across the OECD countries. 
The report then turns to the issue of using indicators and, in particular, how to use them for learning 
purposes. These are the topics covered by the last two sections. Indicators can be used for management, 
communication, and accountability (Section 4). Major emphasis is on management because this is a pre-
condition for communication and accountability. Without management, there is very little to communicate 
and no accountability. Communication is strong when objective measures are matched by perception 
indexes. However, the experience on administrative burdens shows that there is often a gap between 
objective and subjective measures. In these circumstances, a communication strategy should explain why 
the gaps exist rather than denying their existence. It is also suggested to communicate both annual progress 
and the longer-term vision of regulatory reform. Regulatory reform is after all a narrative of change, and 
like in all stories trust in the narrator is important – the identification of the person responsible for 
communication and 'telling the story' is a crucial step. On accountability, the main danger is to fall into un-
realistic expectations that all end-users of regulation will engage with regulatory indicators. The report 
suggests some realistic and sensible ways to utilise indicators for accountability purposes. 
The final section of the report (Section 5) looks at one particular aspect of utilisation: learning. There 
is a classic trade-off between oversight and learning. The more we control, the less we create conditions 
favourable to learning. The less we control, the higher the chances for learning within and between 
organisations as well as between countries. However, there is a side effect: The less we monitor, the less 
we are able to channel these newly created instances of learning towards specific goals for change. This 
trade off between learning and monitoring, however, can be eased by designing jointly the indicators and 
the processes in which they are used. Countries that adopt indicators but do not design a process in which 
they should be used are pre-destined to failure. An annual parliamentary session on the regulatory agenda 
of the government, similar to the annual session on the finance bill, is a strong institutional incentive to use 
indicators. There are other processes in which indicators fuel learning. Looking at the relationship between 
the oversight unit and the departments, indicators can be employed to structure an annual workshop of on 
regulatory quality within different departments. Economic regulators may have their own reflective 
processes, fostered by the use of common methodologies, language and measures. Regional governments 
may engage in benchmarking drawing on common sets of indicators. 
International organisations like the OECD and the European Commission have a major role to play in 
the diffusion of indicators. The OECD is an active agent of cross-national learning. Its regulatory reviews 
of individual member states would benefit from the inclusion of a standard chapter showing the trend of 
regulatory indicators in that country. 
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1. Introduction  
The regulatory reform agenda is always work in progress. Since the 1970s, there have been different 
waves of reform emphasising de-regulation, privatisation, re-regulation, and the creation of independent 
regulatory agencies. Regulation indeed is a broad term covering a number of governance activities carried 
out by the state, international organisations, private actors, and civil-societal organisations. In this report, 
we discuss indicators suitable for measuring the performance of programs that (a) cover the production and 
implementation of regulation across sectors rather than disciplining individual domains, (b) enhance 
governmental capacity to provide high-quality regulation, thus embracing a governance agenda 
(consultation, access to regulation, transparency, participatory policy making using information and 
communication technologies), and (c) are neutral to the total level of state intervention and regulatory 
activity (OECD, 2002, 2008a). Activities measured by such indicators are often linked to notions of „better 
regulation‟ (Lofstedt, 2007; Radaelli, 2007; Wiener, 2007; European Commission, 2009), “smart 
regulation” (Baldwin, 2005; Jensen et al., 2010; European Commission, 2011) or „regulatory oversight‟ 
(Alemanno, 2007; Wiener and Alemanno, 2010). The emphasis is on the quality of regulation, although the 
smart regulation movement across the OECD has also features of 'quantity' such as the programs for the 
reduction of administrative burdens implemented in several countries (OECD, 2007) and the “one-in-one-
out” initiative in the United Kingdom (Better Regulation Executive, 2011). 
Reviewing the literature 
There is a large body of literature dealing with regulatory reform indicators. This includes pioneering 
works such as the OECD paper by Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (1999) and studies focusing on the 
regulatory dimension of good governance (Kaufmann et al., 2003, 2005), regulation and competitiveness 
(as evidenced by indicators of the World Economic Forum), and comparisons between objective indicators 
and perceptions-based indicators of the extent of regulation (Nicoletti and Pryor, 2001). Jalilian, 
Kirkpatrick and Parker (2007) have measured the effects of regulatory reform on economic growth, 
thereby providing a broad review of studies of regulatory quality and economic performance in developing 
countries. The World Bank has developed a large data-set of governance indicators with composite 
measures covering voice and accountability, political instability, government effectiveness, rule of law, 
corruption, and regulatory quality (price controls, market restrictions, burdens on business). Radaelli and 
De Francesco (2007) have surveyed the cross-country experience and designed indicators of regulatory 
quality for four instruments: impact assessment, consultation, simplification, and access to regulation. 
Their survey of regulatory performance measures includes Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In Australia, policy officers (Argy and 
Johnson, 2003) and academics (Carroll, 2007) have commented on the use of regulatory performance 
indicators by the government. 
Crafts (2006) has reviewed the evidence on quantitative estimates of the regulatory effects on 
macroeconomic productivity outcomes. He also addresses compliance costs, noting the weakness of 
measurement in this area:  
“[T]here is, as yet, relatively little evidence on the costs of regulation, either to permit international 
comparisons or to quantify the impact on productivity in the UK. If, however, regulation has had a 
substantial impact on productivity growth, then it will have done so through its distorting effects 
on investment and innovation, rather than simply through administrative costs.” (ibid., p. 192)  
The literature on the results of the more recent wave of better or smart regulation reforms is scant. In 
2005, Kox produced findings on the economic effects of administrative burdens. At the OECD, Jacobzone 
et al. (2010) used the results of the OECD surveys of regulatory quality to present trends across the OECD 
member states, including correlations with other datasets such as the Doing Business Indicators project 
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initiated by the World Bank. Using different types of regression (fixed effects and random effects) they 
also estimate the impact of regulatory reform on growth. Radaelli (2010) provides ten-point scales to 
measure theory-predicted effects of better regulation in six countries and the European Commission, 
showing high variability in the results achieved by governments using regulatory impact assessment (RIA).  
The OECD has developed an index of requirements for and extent of regulatory impact assessment 
based on data provided by the member states. The European Commission-funded project EVIA, Evaluating 
Integrated Impact Assessments, generated work on regulatory indicators by Anne Meuwese and Claudio 
Radaelli. Amongst others, the authors suggest differentiating regulatory indicators by purpose. Further, 
they develop design criteria such as effectiveness (or „economic sophistication‟), accountability, and 
oversight (Evaluating Integrated Impact Assessment, 2008). Another European Commission-funded 
project, European Network for Better Regulation, led by the Centre for European Policy Studies, 
established a database of impact assessments called Diadem where individual RIAs produced by different 
European countries are coded according to a list of quality indicators covering problem definition, 
consultation, analysis of alternative options, economic evidence, and models. The data in Diadem are now 
out-of-date, but the template followed to code RIAs is still useful. The Centre for European Policy Studies 
has carried on with the coding of all RIAs produced by the European Commission, drawing on a coding 
frame that extends the previous Diadem template (Fritsch et al. 2012). Recently, Carroll (2010) has 
addressed the topic of how policy makers use of regulatory impact assessment. His paper is part of the 
broad qualitative literature on RIA usages (see Radaelli, 2009 among others). Both in Europe and the 
United States, studies have been published on coding different aspects of regulatory impact assessment 
(Renda, 2006; Cecot et al., 2008; Hahn and Tetlock, 2008). Again, this type of study is based on a 
scorecard containing several items (such as problem definition, analysis of options, and quantification). 
Cecot et al. (2008) apply the scorecard method to each individual RIA and then cumulate the results in 
simple tables of United States (US) and European Union (EU) performance – although with a sufficiently 
large sample a proper statistical analysis would be possible.  
A consultancy firm (Jacobs, 2009) has provided a state-of-the-art paper on regulatory indicators and 
made suggestions for implementation in Canada. Jacobs (2009) and Radaelli and De Francesco (2007) 
suggest different systems of indicators to be implemented over time: a basic system in year one, an 
operational system to build capacity for oversight and measurement, followed by a management system. 
Thus there is an important issue concerning priority and the process of rolling out indicators over time, 
starting from simple measures, building capacity, and then moving on to more sophisticated types of 
indicators for the management of regulatory systems. Among others, Jacobs has focused on the 
management of the regulatory system in that indicators provide information that policymakers can relate 
back to the instruments they control. We shall follow up on priorities and management in the remainder of 
this report. 
Contribution of this report 
This report examines and appraises the state of play with a range of regulatory quality indicators. It 
thereby contributes to the specialised body of work on measuring regulatory reform performance and the 
usage of tools like consultation, the standard cost model, and regulatory impact assessment. Measuring 
results is important 
 for communication purposes; 
 because data are indispensable to manage the regulatory system and plan reform, including 
termination of programs that are not producing the expected results, and 
 to establish accountability and show the value for money of regulatory reform. 
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Measuring the performance of regulatory reform involves different elements such as concepts, 
indicators, and evaluation. Concepts define dimensions of quality. They should be derived from key 
principles of regulatory reform, e.g. effectiveness, legitimacy, fairness, simplification and 
comprehensiveness. Indicators are quantitative expressions of phenomena captured by concepts. 
Evaluation draws on systems of indicators. However, it also necessitates cumulative findings from case 
studies, interviews, surveys or scorecard approaches. 
This report is dedicated to measuring and reporting performance in the field of regulatory reform. It 
does not systematically discuss the wider economic effects of regulatory reform, or the relationship 
between reform and final outcomes. This is the subject matter of another report, prepared for the OECD 
Regulatory Policy Committee. 
Structure of the report 
The report is organised as follows. Section 2 reports on the cross-national experience with measuring 
performance of regulatory reform. Section 3 introduces design principles and provides a panel of indicators 
for regulatory management. This is the key component of our paper, and is supported by tables portraying 
the panel of indicators and how they appraised. Section 4 tackles the usage of indicators while Section 5 is 
concerned with learning through the production and usage of indicators. 
2. The cross-country experience  
In this section, we present indicators used by countries to measure and appraise the quality of their 
regulatory reform policy. We briefly present our methodology and then discuss five types of indicators: 
input indicators, process indicators, output indicators, intermediary outcome indicators, and final outcome 
indicators.  
 Input – these are design activities, such as adopting consultation, the standard cost model 
for the reduction of administrative burdens, and impact assessment, or establishing a 
regulatory oversight body. 
 The process of connecting the inputs and producing results. Typically, processes define the 
scope and extent of tools like impact assessment, how the standard cost model is going to 
be used in practice, and the standards for consultation and other regulatory activities. 
 The output refers to the activities carried out in a given period, such as how many 
consultations or impact assessment took place in a year, whether individual consultations 
match the quality standards set in the system, and so on;  
 Intermediary outcomes cover behavioural and cognitive change, considering how 
regulators and inspectors perceive regulation, and how citizens and the business 
community rate the regulatory efforts of the government. Data on inspections and 
enforcements also belong to this category. 
 Finally, the causal chain should also show the effects of regulatory reform on final 
outcomes, such as number of new firms created and other classic economic indicators that 
are causally linked to regulatory activity. 
This analysis provides the basis for recommendations made in Section 3 on the future development 
and usage of indicators in regulatory reform. 
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Methodology 
During the preparation of this report we relied on the following three data collection methods: a 
questionnaire, expert interviews, and an analysis of domestic policy documents. We considered regulatory 
reform tools or programs that were used or initiated at a national or supranational level and were applied 
across policy sectors. Hence, we disregarded regulatory reform tools or programs at subnational level (e.g. 
municipalities, regions, states) or those targeting individual policy fields (for instance health policy, 
environmental regulation, or social security). 
Questionnaire: We sent out a questionnaire to representatives of countries that engage in the OECD 
Ad Hoc Steering Group on Measuring Regulatory Performance. The following ten countries were 
involved: Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. The questionnaire asked three sets of questions related to:  
 Key actors and institutions involved in regulatory reform, e.g. audit offices, regulatory 
oversight bodies, and departments or ministries related to the measurement and evaluation 
of regulatory reform, and relevant publications and reports. 
 Indicators of regulatory performance, the sector of regulatory policy they cover (e.g. 
quantity of laws, procedures of administrative appeal, regulatory impact assessment, public 
access and consultation, the reduction of administrative burdens, or ex-post regulatory 
reviews), who gathers them, when, and since when.  
 Usage of these indicators, methods and tools, e.g. public debates, parliamentary hearings, 
communication efforts. 
Expert interviews: Building on the responses received on the questionnaire, we talked to national 
experts in order to enhance our understanding of how regulatory policy performance is measured in 
specific policy contexts.  
Analysis of policy documents: Finally, we conducted a web search for policy documents related to 
regulatory reform and to the measurement of regulatory policies. We hereby focused on regulatory 
oversight bodies, national audit offices and government departments promoting regulatory reform. 
Input indicators 
Budget: The overall budget provided for regulatory policy and oversight at departments and agencies 
is considered a useful indicator for the capacity of a regulatory system. Although the regulatory budget 
could easily be extracted from departmental or state budgets, countries rarely make this information public 
and use it systematically as an indicator. Radaelli and De Francesco (2007), Evaluating Integrated Impact 
Assessment (2008) and De Francesco, Radaelli and Troeger (2012) report on the application of this 
indicator in Europe, Northern America and Australasia. 
Staff: In a similar vain, staff involved in regulatory policy and oversight across departments and 
agencies is a fairly significant indicator for the capacity of a regulatory system. As part of departmental or 
governmental work plans, staff numbers are available in many OECD member countries (Radaelli and De 
Francesco, 2007, Evaluating Integrated Impact Assessment, 2008 and De Francesco, et al., 2012). 
However, so far this data is not systematically used in those countries to produce indicators of regulatory 
capacity. 
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Training: The number of public officials in departments and agencies participating in training on 
regulatory policy and oversight is an alternative measure for the capacity of regulatory systems. Since late 
2008, authorities in New Zealand measure the extent of training on RIA offered, calculated by numbers of 
officers trained. De Francesco, et al. (2012) in their comparative study discuss this indicator. 
Process (or system-level) indicators 
In 2009, the OECD published a report on indicators of regulatory management systems. The OECD 
report provides indicators on how 31 member states have designed their system of regulatory reform. 
These indicators refer to the main characteristics of the process through which regulation is produced, 
appraised and implemented, covering forward planning, RIA, consultation, the reduction of administrative 
obligations and other dimensions and tool. It is important to observe that these indicators inform on the 
presence or absence of certain features in the regulatory process of a given country. such as whether impact 
assessment guidelines cover the environmental dimension or not, or whether there is a plan to evaluate and 
eliminate red tape. These indicators do not tell us how the individual impact assessments or the plan to 
eliminate administrative obligations fare in relation to the criteria and timetable set by the government. In 
developing these indicators, the OECD took a systemic perspective. Since these indicators are internally 
coherent, and in most cases have been measured already in three different periods of time, we consider that 
there is nothing to add to this important dimension of smart regulation. This report supports the adoption 
and usage of these systemic indicators in the context of the larger control panel proposed here. Put 
differently, the process or systemic dimension is well-taken care of by using the OECD indicators. 
Output indicators 
Forward planning: Countries engage in forward planning if they publish on a regular basis plans for 
the introduction, review or repeal of primary laws and subordinate regulations. 
 The proportion of regulatory agencies publishing such a plan is a quantitative measure of forward 
planning (Jacobs, 2009). While a number of OECD countries plan their legislative and regulatory 
activities, only a few collect the data required to assess the application of that tool. Most 
prominently, Australia (Office of Best Practice Regulation, 2009) and New Zealand measure this 
indicator. 
 To our knowledge, no country measures the quality of forward planning, i.e. the degree of detail, 
understandability, reliability and completeness of forward plans. 
Regulatory impact assessment: The systematic appraisal of legislative proposals is, next to 
consultations and the ex-post assessment of regulatory burdens, the most widely used tool in regulatory 
reform. OECD countries have developed diverse methods to assess departmental and agency performance 
in policy appraisal: 
 Comprehensiveness of the RIA system: The absolute or relative (in per cent) number of primary 
laws and, measured separately, subordinate regulations appraised is a significant quantitative 
indicator for the performance of a RIA system. Obviously, findings depend on the number of 
exemptions from policy appraisal, i.e. for minor or urgent legislative initiatives or those subject 
to confidentiality. Australia and New Zealand calculate this indicator, whereby Australia covers 
three related dimensions: the proportion of regulations requiring a RIA for which an adequate 
RIA was prepared, the proportion of regulations requiring a stand-alone assessment of 
compliance costs for which an assessment was provided, and the proportion of regulations 
requiring a RIA or stand-alone assessment of compliance costs which met the requirement to 
undertake a preliminary assessment and consult with the regulatory oversight body before a 
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decision was made (Office of Best Practice Regulation, 2009). Further, Sweden measures the 
number of regulatory proposals that lack an impact assessment. 
 RIA guidelines: Many countries have developed guidelines to aid officers during the preparation 
of RIAs, for instance Denmark (Regeringen i Danmark, 2005), Sweden (Regeringskansliet, 
2007), and the United Kingdom (Better Regulation Executive, 2010). Based on legally binding 
statutory requirements or non-binding recommendations, guidance documents present items 
obligatory for regulatory appraisals, e.g. the identification of a specific regulatory problem, the 
consideration of alternative options, the measurement of positive and negative economic effects, 
a discussion of whether rights were involved and, if so, the respective consequences, compliance 
costs, environmental and social impacts, provisions on implementation and enforcement, as well 
as contact names and email addresses. 
 Qualitative assessments of the quality of RIA: Guidelines constitute a baseline against which 
national regulatory oversight bodies may assess the quality of individual policy appraisals. Such 
qualitative assessments are conducted in, amongst others, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand 
(NZIER, 2009, Legislation Advisory Committee, 2008, 2010, 2011), Sweden (Swedish Better 
Regulation Council, 2011), and the United Kingdom (National Audit Office, 2007a, Regulatory 
Policy Committee, 2011a). However, checklists are rarely transformed into indicators that could 
be used in order to assess the overall production of RIAs in a given country. Many national 
oversight bodies have therefore checklist items in mind when assessing RIAs yet focus on 
qualitative comments on individual assessments rather than systematic quantitative analyses. 
Furthermore, countries are somewhat selective with regard to the core areas of their impact 
assessments and focus, for instance, on economic impacts rather than environmental or social 
ones. 
 Compound RIA quality indicators: A few countries, however, go beyond qualitative assessments 
and use compound quality indicators derived from or, at least, reflecting upon criteria to be found 
in the guidelines. For many years, the United Kingdom has assessed the quality of RIA through a 
set of six indicators (National Audit Office, 2005, 2006a, 2007a):  
 Was the scope and purpose of RIAs clearly defined?  
 Was consultation effective?  
 Did the department assess costs and benefits thoroughly and realistically?  
 Did the RIA realistically assess compliance?  
 Will the regulation be effectively implemented, monitored and evaluated?  
 Did the RIA consider the impact of the regulation on competition?  
Each of these indicators summarises a number of sub-indicators. With regard to consultation, for 
instance, the following sub-indicators informed the overall assessment:  
 Was effective consultation started early in the process?  
 Were appropriate techniques used?  
 Did the department explain clearly the impact of regulation?  
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 Were all interested stakeholders consulted, including within Government?  
 Were the impacts on small businesses considered?  
 Were the results of consultation used appropriately? 
In a similar fashion, the United Kingdom has looked into impact assessment of economic regulators 
(National Audit Office, 2007b). Since 2010 the Regulatory Policy Committee appraises the quality of 
regulatory impact assessment in the United Kingdom using five indicators measuring the quality of 
justification for intervention, of presentation of options, of evidence base, of cost-benefit analysis and of 
the overall presentation (Regulatory Policy Committee, 2010, 2011b, 2012). Authorities in New Zealand 
use indicators internally only, amongst others the proportion of papers that (a) consider regulatory policy 
issues or options, (b) that identify whether the RIA requirements apply, (c) that report substantive public 
consultation, and (d) that include a partial or full quantification of costs and benefits. These measurements 
could easily be used for the creation of compound indicators. Further, the consultancy group NZIER 
(2009) supports the government of New Zealand in assessing the quality of policy appraisal offering 
qualitative judgments and then calculating simple aggregate statistics. Likewise, the Swedish Better 
Regulation Council (2011) publishes annual reports containing information about the number of opinions 
by the Council and how many RIAs were considered acceptable, deficient or missing across departments. 
Further, Hahn, Lutter and Viscusi, 2000; Hahn and Tetlock, 2007, Hahn and Dudley, 2004, Cecot et al. 
(2008) and Fritsch et al. (2012) offer comparative assessments of the EU, the US and the UK, using a 
scorecard approach. 
 Sampling: Countries tend to assess the quality of RIAs on basis of samples (for the UK, see 
National Audit Office, 2007b, 2010) or other formats of prescreening (for the UK, see Regulatory 
Policy Committee, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012) rather than the full annual and departmental 
population of prelegislative appraisal. At times, oversight bodies focus on specific kinds of 
appraisal, e.g. of social and environmental benefits and costs (for the UK, see National Audit 
Office, 2006b) or those produced by specific agencies such as economic regulators (for the UK, 
see National Audit Office, 2007b).  
 Surveys and desk research: So far, all indicators presented were objective in nature and mainly 
measured through scorecards. However, both the European Commission and the National Audit 
Office in the United Kingdom have experimented with perception surveys in order to measuring 
the performance of regulatory impact assessment. At times, the National Audit Office (2010) 
complements scorecard approaches with interviews or surveys of desk officers. Similarly, The 
Evaluation Partnership, a London-based consulting company, assessed the European 
Commission‟s RIA system and conducted surveys both with stakeholders and regulators. Further, 
The Evaluation Partnership carried out desk research with a view to obtain additional information 
on guidelines, policy documents, and external reports resulting in six in-depth case studies of 
impact assessment at EU level. Further, Canada commissioned a similar study more than ten 
years ago (Regulatory Consulting Group and Delphi Group, 2000). 
Consultation: The involvement of non-state actors in regulation is a cornerstone of the good-
governance discourse and a key item on the better regulation agenda. While all studied countries have 
extensive mechanisms in place to consult business and civil-societal actors on forthcoming legislation and 
rulemaking, few initiatives have been started to measure the quality and quantity of these efforts. 
 To our knowledge, Australia is the only country that has developed an indicator measuring 
the quality of consultation in rulemaking. Measurements provide information on the 
proportion of regulations for which the consultation process was „adequate‟. The substance 
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of „adequacy‟ is derived from internal guidelines. There is no information available on the 
quality of specific dimensions of consultation, i.e. scope, timing, and duration (Office of 
Best Practice Regulation, 2009). Australian authorities complement insights gathered 
through this indicator with additional information provided in RIA documents (Carroll, 
2007). Further, the Productivity Commission (2010) calculates the numbers of stakeholder 
submissions received, hence providing a quantitative measure. 
 Other countries such as the United Kingdom National Audit Office, 2007a, 2010) or New 
Zealand (NZIER, 2009) use information provided in RIAs in order to draw conclusions 
about the quality of consultation. 
 Perceptions surveys among business and non-governmental organisations are an 
alternative to objective measures of the quality and quantity of consultation in rulemaking. 
So far, no country uses this approach. However, as will be argued later, some countries do 
more general perception surveys on regulation and regulatory reform that potentially could 
include a question on consultation and involvement. 
Post-implementation reviews are carried out in many countries but their number and performance is 
rarely measured systematically. Since 2009, New Zealand assesses the number and status of post-
implementation reviews. Likewise, the UK‟s National Audit Offices calculates the percentage of 
regulations for which a post-implementation review is produced (National Audit Office, 2009b). Based on 
survey data, the National Audit Office also provides estimates about the types of review carried out and 
how results from post-implementation reviews have been used. 
Intermediate outcome indicators 
Perception surveys among regulators: According to our knowledge, the Netherlands are the only 
country to have conducted systematic perception surveys among regulators with a view to core themes of 
regulatory reform. Building on previous studies in 2005 and 2006, in 2010 the Netherlands conducted a 
perception survey among 1 000 employees of all ministries (ACTAL, 2011). The survey had an individual 
and an organisational component. With regard to individual officers, the survey examined the knowledge, 
attitudes, and conduct of individual government officials when it comes to reducing administrative 
burdens. At an organisational level, the survey sought to establish the level of attention paid by ministers 
and senior officials to reduce administrative burdens in the rulemaking process. 
Perception surveys among business and citizens: Perception surveys examine issues of satisfaction 
with, perceptions and attitudes on, and understanding and awareness of regulation and government 
attempts to improve the regulatory environment. Perception surveys are conducted on the telephone, via 
mail or face-to-face and have become a key tool in many national better regulation policies. 
 The following countries conduct perception surveys among business representatives: 
Australia (Ipsos-Eureka, 2009), Belgium (Kegels, 2010), Canada (Government of Canada, 
2006b, 2006a, 2010a, 2010b, Canadian Federation of Independent Business, 2010), 
Denmark (Rigsrevisionen, 2007), Netherlands (Deloitte, 2010; Stratus, 2010; ACTAL, 
2011), New Zealand (BusinessNZ KPMG, 2008), Spain (see Camaras, 2010), the UK 
(MORI, 2007a; National Audit Office, 2009a). 
 The United Kingdom also conducted a survey among citizens (MORI, 2007b). 
 Surveys examine the following issues: perceptions of the government‟s approach to 
regulation, key burdens when complying with regulation, how people experience 
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regulation through their work and personal lives, fairness and proportionality, complexity 
of government activities, government understanding of business needs, quality of 
consultation, importance of reducing regulation, awareness of government activities 
(OECD, 2012).  
Specific measurement of the performance of regulatory oversight structures (or regulatory quality 
assurance bureaus) like the Better Regulation Executive in the UK are scarce. There are annual reports 
produced by regulatory quality bureaus offices, however, yet the quality and quantity of public reporting 
differs. In Spain, a number of governmental agencies report on regulation and regulatory reform, e.g. the 
Ministry of Territorial Policy and Public Administration, various regulatory agencies on energy, 
competition, telecoms, as well as the Ombudsman (The Ombudsman of Spain, 2009). The Swedish Better 
Regulation Council (2011) informs about its activities while the UK‟s National Audit Office, the Better 
Regulation Executive and the Regulatory Policy Committee engage in extensive attempts to inform the 
public about progress made on regulatory reform (Better Regulation Executive, 2009; National Audit 
Office, 2011; Regulatory Policy Committee, 2011a). Likewise, the US Office of Management and Budget 
reports regularly to Congress (2009, 2010, 2011). 
It should also be observed that regulatory oversight is a broad, multi-bureau function. Over the last 
decade, several countries have invested in a robust oversight framework by using regulatory oversight 
bodies, but also independent watchdogs for specific functions (such as measuring and validating the 
reduction of administrative burdens by individual departments), and new regulatory quality bodies like the 
UK Regulatory Policy Committee that specialise in one function (in this case, a quality assurance function 
concerning the RIAs produced by the departments). 
Number of laws and pages: Many OECD member countries report on the number of primary and 
secondary legal acts that could be used as an indicator of the extent of legislation and regulation. For 
example, in Sweden the Regeringskansliet (2010) calculates the number of legal acts and regulations 
across policy areas. Equally, the UK‟s Law Commission 2006 calculated the number and pages of public 
general acts, rewrite acts, consolidation acts and statutory instruments. In New Zealand, authorities 
calculate the numbers of primary and secondary legislative instruments in force, broken down by 
administering agency. 
Final outcome indicators 
Final outcomes are the subject of the companion paper delivered by Professor Coglianese.
3
 There is 
plenty of information available at this level. In the past, studies carried out by the European Commission 
(Radaelli and De Francesco, 2007) have argued for the adoption across countries of final economic 
indicators drawn from the World Bank experience and classic single market and innovation measures. The 
Doing Business Indicators is yet another well-known set of economic indicators used for international 
comparisons. It hinges on two relationships: one between regulatory quality and the performance of firms; 
and another between regulatory quality and macro-economic performance. Although there is evidence 
supporting the former, the latter is more difficult to assess, given the many variables that generate a given 
level of macro-economic performance (IEG, 2008). We also need to consider the important role played by 
the historical and institutional context when we interpret Doing Business Indicators in a given country 
(Independent Evaluation Group, 2008). 
Assessment of administrative burdens: In order to monitor the growth of their regulation, countries 
publish regulatory budgets, i.e. documents containing ceilings or targets of regulatory costs to be met by 
the various regulatory programs or agency departments. The international experience shows two different 
approaches to regulatory budgets: The holistic approach accounts for all regulatory costs and compares 
them to the regulatory benefits. We will discuss this approach more extensively in Section 2.18. The 
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minimalist approach, instead, focuses on a single component of the total regulatory costs, most 
prominently administrative burdens. Countries assess the achievements made in reducing administrative 
costs using the standard cost model. 
 Several OECD member states have established net administrative burdens reduction 
targets and used the standard cost model in order to assess the achievements of these 
reduction initiatives. Australia (Productivity Commission, 2010), Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark (Government of Denmark, 2005, Center for Kvalitet i ErhvervsRegulering, 
2010), Germany (Federal Statistical, Office, 2006), the Netherlands (Regulatory Reform 
Group, 2008, 2010), Norway (Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2008), Poland, 
Spain, Sweden (Regeringskansliet, 2011), and the United Kingdom (National Audit Office, 
2008a) aimed at reducing administrative costs by 25%. Belgium established reduction 
targets between 10 and 33% (depending on the department) and Spain aims at reducing 
burdens by 30% in a given time frame. More complete and detailed country-by-country 
data on these initiatives and programs can be found on www.administrative-burdens.com. 
 In their perception survey, Canadian authorities explored the following issues: perception 
of changes in the overall cost of complying with regulations over the past three years, 
reasons for perceived increases in overall compliance costs, average annual costs per 
employee for the information obligations covered in the survey, total compliance costs, 
three-year trend analysis of factors affecting regulatory compliance costs, average nominal 
costs per business and employee (Government of Canada, 2010a, 2010b). Obviously, the 
measurement of administrative burdens through perception surveys bears a close 
resemblance to more general perception surveys of regulation. As argued above, the 
following countries conduct perception surveys among business representatives: Australia 
(Ipsos-Eureka, 2009), Belgium (Kegels, 2010), Canada (Government of Canada, 2006b, 
2006a, 2010a, 2010b, Canadian Federation of Independent Business, 2010), Denmark 
(Rigsrevisionen, 2007), Netherlands (Deloitte, 2010, Stratus, 2010, ACTAL, 2011), New 
Zealand (BusinessNZ KPMG, 2008), Spain (see Camaras, 2010), the UK (MORI, 2007a, 
National Audit Office, 2009a). 
 As an alternative measure, the UK‟s National Audit Office estimates, in a 2008 report, the 
number of inspections and compares types of enforcement actions across departments 
(National Audit Office, 2008b). 
Total benefits and costs: One indirect way to measure how the overall oversight structure, composed 
of different bodies, performs is to look at broad indicators of total benefits and costs or total cost reduction 
(see also what we said on ex-post indicators). However, measurement of the overall effectiveness of 
regulatory oversight is in all countries still in its infancy. Most prominently, the United States measures the 
sum of all costs of regulations in effect (aggregate measure) and also calculate the cost-effectiveness 
(comparison of cost per unit of benefit) of regulations adopted during the year as well as costs and benefits 
of major rules and trends in the annual benefits and costs (Office of Management and Budget, 2009, 2010, 
2011). These indicators are a compilation of RIAs.  
To sum up our findings 
The countries surveyed provide evidence of activities in regulatory reform and information about 
tools. However, there are few examples of countries that have also moved from activities and information 
to data and proper indicators. One common result across countries is that indicators are skewed around 
measurements of administrative burdens, whilst other areas of regulatory reform activities have been 
neglected. Even less common is the final step from indicators to their usage in regulatory management 
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strategies. It follows that over the next few years governments should seek to close the loop among these 
four important steps, and connect activities, information, data, and usage. If done gradually countries can 
learn from their early steps.  
The current state of developing and using indicators resembles in a way maps of the planet showing 
different temperatures: In terms of presence or absence of indicators, we have very cold areas of regulatory 
reform, for instance responsive regulation and enforcement. We have temperate zones such as regulatory 
impact assessment. And we have areas that are definitively warm or hot such as administrative burdens. 
The climate is also cold in the „usage‟ area but hotter in the domains of „activities‟ and „information‟ and 
temperate around „data‟.  
This map of the regulatory reform planet stands in contrast to the trajectory suggested by the OECD 
and other organisations like the World Bank and the European Commission. These organisations have 
suggested on several occasions to move from a narrow focus on administrative burdens to a comprehensive 
consideration of regulatory costs, and from cost considerations to benefit-cost principles. This is an 
important re-orientation of regulatory policy from quantity to quality of regulation, as is the move towards 
considering distributional effects of regulation or sustainability and climate change. In this connection, 
recent research for the World Bank has shown how impact assessment and other tools have to be 
re-calibrated to accomplish goals in the area of sustainability (Russel and Radaelli, 2010). Another 
important dimension concerns rights as a recent UK study demonstrates (Prosser, 2010): Regulators are 
involved in appraisal activities that are no longer limited to the dimension of economic efficiency but 
concern wider issues of rights as well as distributional issues. This is not a consequence of changing 
political goals. It is the effect of new legal frameworks governing regulators such as charters and human 
rights acts in Europe. New regulatory domains add to the dimension of rights the dimension of ethics and 
moral issues, as indicated by the regulation of scientific research in areas like stem cells and embryology 
(Prosser, 2010). 
Finally, there is a problem with the current debate in regulatory reform in that the discussion of 
individual tools and their usage, including indicators of performance designed for each tool, although 
necessary, may miss the whole point of integrated regulatory management. Tools are important, but how 
they are connected is even more important. Equally fundamental is how governments allocate resources 
and oversight activities across the life cycle of regulation. In this connection, citizens and firms also 
demand information and data on the value-for-money of regulatory oversight. New regulatory oversight 
bodies have been established in the last ten years, and existing ones have maintained their importance. The 
question arises whether these new bodies show their value-for-money, report to elected officers such as 
parliamentary committees, and are themselves evaluated externally. This is a new area where regulatory 
oversight bodies are asked to pass their own benefit-cost test. 
These are wide-ranging discussions, and some go well beyond the design and usage of indicators. 
However, the debate under way should at least inform indicators and point them towards the right 
direction. In the next section, we will discuss design criteria first, and then discuss and evaluate indicators 
for regulatory management. The management orientation makes these indicators complementary to but 
different from the indicators used by independent researchers to compare the regulatory systems of 
different countries. Management indicators have a strong link with policy instruments that can be 
calibrated by policymakers to produce desirable results, learn, and support communication campaigns. 
3. Design and selection of indicators 
In this section of the report we discuss indicators of regulatory reform in relation to a list of important 
design criteria. We explain first what the priorities are. Next we will turn to how the indicators can be 
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originated and the dimensions they cover. We will then devote to the criteria and assess the indicators 
against them. 
Principles 
Since resources are constrained, indicators of regulatory quality have to be developed with clear 
priorities in mind. Our review of the experience across a sample of OECD countries has shown that the 
progress made with regulatory indicators is limited and skewed. Limited because there is information, but 
the average OECD member state is not used to producing regulatory indicators. Even when regulatory 
reform generates indicators there is little in the public domain. There is basic activity as far as indicators 
for monitoring and internal accountability purposes are concerned and even less has been done in relation 
to measures used for communication purposes (be it communication to Ministers and parliamentary 
committees or communication for the general public). There are exceptions of course, but they concern a 
handful of countries. Paradoxically, there is information available in regulatory oversight bodies and more 
generally in government. The problem is that information is not collected systematically with the purpose 
of creating and using indicators.  
One exception to this general rule is the type of yes-no information on the Process dimension of 
regulatory reform, i.e. characteristics of regulatory systems and oversight. With regard to regulatory 
management systems the OECD has already produced indicators, relying on self-assessed questionnaires 
compiled by governments. These indicators were collected in 1998, 2005 and 2008 (OECD, 2009). They 
represent a valuable repository of information, especially for the purpose of comparing countries and-or 
detecting how certain families or clusters of countries move over time, from 1998 to 2008 (Jacobzone et 
al., 2007).  
However, to compare and identify trends is not the same thing as to manage and take decisions. To 
manage the regulatory system and its tools, governments need a different type of indicators. Indicators of 
regulatory management provide information on how the tools are deployed on the ground and how the 
oversight structure performs. To illustrate, whilst the OECD indicators tell us whether a certain country has 
adopted consultation and uses a benefit-cost test for new regulation, they do not tell us how many 
consultations in a given year meet the government standards and if the benefit-cost test is applied 
systematically or not. The emphasis on the OECD indicators is on adoption of tools and the principles 
enshrined in the tools, not on how the tools perform. To make another example, the OECD indicators do 
not tell us how many RIAs in a given year have identified benefits, but only if the regulators are required 
(by government guidelines or existing administrative law) to identify benefits. For this type of information 
we have to turn to indicators often used by independent researchers (see literature reviews in Renda 2006, 
Radaelli and De Francesco, 2007) but not common in the experience of the governments we have 
surveyed. 
As mentioned, regulatory measurement is also skewed. Most of the efforts since 2005 have been in 
relation to administrative burdens. This has been a very expensive activity with limited scientific basis 
(Helm, 2006). On the one hand, the OECD member states have invested in baseline measurement of 
administrative burdens. On the other hand, they have tracked down the progress made by validating the 
reductions of burdens communicated by the government with subjective measures based on responses of 
firms. In some cases, we have surveys that track down four or five years of responses, thus showing the 
patterns across time. These measurement efforts have been effective in a phase of regulatory management 
in which it was important to reach at least a 25% reduction of administrative burdens and validate this 
reduction by using the perceptions of the stakeholders.  
Obviously it is important to maintain the administrative obligations baseline measurement „alive‟ and 
make sure that burdens to do not increase via new regulation. Guidelines for regulatory impact assessment 
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of new regulations have been often adjusted to achieve this goal. But it is widely acknowledged that once a 
country has invested resources in compressing burdens by 25% once or twice, resources have to be re-
invested towards wider goals such as capturing the full extent of compliance costs and balancing costs and 
benefits in regulatory policy. This is one reason for re-directing resources from measuring administrative 
burdens to other dimensions of regulatory reform. It is a compelling reason because the causality leading 
from a reduction of burdens to a better regulatory environment is disputed (Helm, 2006). We do not know 
whether burdens are created by excess demand or excess supply of regulation. We often measure burdens 
with tools like the standard cost model which do not control for the entity and direction of measurement 
bias. We do not know the exact relationship between the cost of complying with a regulatory obligation 
and the total cost of complying with a regulation, yet for the stakeholders it is the latter that matters, not the 
former. Finally, to establish a causal impact on economic efficiency, burdens generated by a rule have to be 
balanced with the benefits that the rule also provides. But this exercise is normally not contemplated in the 
usages of the standard cost model we are familiar with. 
There is another reason, however. Over the years the tools used by government and the activities 
carried out in the area of regulatory reform have increased considerably. Apart from activities, there has 
been a growth of regulatory oversight bodies, both inside government and with an arm‟s-length relation to 
government. To focus exclusively on the burdens in this scenario of expansion of activities and oversight 
structures creates a skewed set of measures.  
Design 
This brings us to the following step: What should be included in a system of regulatory measures? 
What should these indicators cover? Regulation can be examined along a causal chain going from design 
of institutions and tools to output and outcomes. More precisely, we distinguish the following steps in the 
regulatory chain of causality: input, process, output, intermediary outcomes, final outcomes. 
In this report, we specifically looked at indicators that tap into the three dimensions of input, output 
and intermediate outcomes. The 2009 OECD report on indicators of regulatory management systems does 
already provide an excellent overview and discussion of process indicators, while final outcomes are the 
subject of a companion paper delivered by Professor Cary Coglianese.
4
  
To face the challenge of tracking down the whole set of tools and structures governments have to set 
priorities. One priority is to re-direct resources from administrative burdens measures to other domains of 
regulatory reform. Another is to start collecting data for indicators that do not present particular difficulties 
in data collection, and then move on to more ambitious indicators. Yet another priority is to stage the 
investment of resources and political attention for regulatory quality in three phases:  
 Creating capacity by producing information. 
 Monitoring regulatory reform via an integrated set of measures, a sort of control panel. 
 Comparing measures across countries and over time, thus producing convergence towards 
regulatory reform goals.  
Composite indicators 
This information, however, should not be overwhelming. Policymakers should have a control panel 
that provides synthetic information about the performance of regulatory tools and oversight. To achieve 
this, composite measures are a useful means. There is a vast literature on composite indicators and their 
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usage by governments (OECD, 2008b). In the context of this report, composite measure can be easily 
devised for tools like consultation and RIA.  
It is customary to examine the quality of individual RIAs by using scorecards and checklists (Hahn, 
Malik and Dudley, 2004; Hahn and Dudley, 2004, especially Appendix 1, Table 1; Renda, 2006). The 
individual values of these checklists and scorecards can be summarised in a composite indicator of RIA 
quality and consultation effectiveness, for example. In the past, scorecards focused on the quality of 
economic analysis of RIA. Now that regulators have to handle both economic issues and distributional-
rights issues (as evidenced by Tony Prosser's study on UK regulators, see Prosser, 2010) these scorecards 
could be adjusted to reflect the quality of analysis of distributional issues and whether rights are correctly 
discussed in consultation and regulatory impact assessment.  
Composite indicators raise the question whether all the variables weigh the same or not. The OECD – 
we suggest – should make use of its working parties to forge consensus on weights. This is preferable to 
the choice of independent experts assigning weights to the individual variables of a composite indicator – 
the argument is dealt with at length in Radaelli and De Francesco (2007). 
In short, when setting priorities, governments should follow a coherent and balanced set of policy 
goals: 
 From administrative burdens to wider notions of regulatory compliance costs in order to 
improve on the overall regulatory environment and not only in some specific areas. In this 
domain, simplification remains a fundamental goal. 
 From an emphasis on costs to the benefit cost principle to secure effectiveness and fairness 
of regulation. Effectiveness of regulation remains the overriding aim in regulatory reform. 
Both for effectiveness and legitimacy purposes, there is consensus on the principle that 
regulation should pass a quality test like „benefits justify the cost‟ rather than quantity tests 
like „no administrative obligations cost in excess of xxx Euro‟. Pluralism, access to 
regulation, and balanced processes of rulemaking are essential to the fairness of the 
system. 
 From objective indicators to a set of measures including both objective and subjective 
measures. In particular, there is awareness that regulatory performance cannot be 
established solely by considering data and indicators produced by government: perceptions 
also matter. Reliance on perceptions measures is becoming a legitimate and popular design 
criterion among OECD countries. An emerging trend is about the consideration of different 
types of perceptions, including perceptions of regulators as well as the more traditional 
perceptions of firms and citizens. The rationale for measuring perceptions of regulators is 
that regulatory reform is about changing culture and attitudes of regulators; hence their 
beliefs shape the quality of regulation. 
 From the economic dimension to rights and distributional effects to secure legitimacy of 
regulation. 
 From a narrow concept of efficiency to a wider concept including inter-temporal efficiency 
and sustainability. 
 From simple measures to composite indicators that capture the essential information about 
the performance of regulatory reform. 
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 From tools to a joint consideration of tools and oversight processes (integrated regulatory 
management). 
 Finally, transparency of the process remains a fundamental design criterion for regulatory 
reform policies. 
Recommending indicators 
After having examined the indicators suggested by the literature and the measured adopted by 
governments, we have identified a number of indicators that look prima facie suitable for regulatory 
management. We have then described and assessed them in Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3. In the descriptive 
mode (Table A.1) we identify the indicator, what it measures, the underlying concept that is supposed to be 
captured by the indicator, data collection issues, usage, and the experience in the countries we surveyed. In 
the evaluative mode (Table A.2) we comment on the costs, the normative-causal assumptions behind the 
indicator, the level of validity and reliability (low or high), discuss other critical aspects and then make a 
final statement as to whether we suggest adoption of the indicator or not. Table A.3 suggests academic and 
policy papers reporting on the use of these indicators and point to OECD member countries that have 
already used those indicators. Please note that the information in Table A.3, Column 12 reflects the 
responses that we received on our questionnaire. No claims are made that Table A.3 is complete; instead 
Column 12 lists examples only. 
In this report, we discuss 21 indicators, 18 of which we recommend for adoption at different stages of 
the regulatory reform process: 
Table 1. Input indicators 
Indicators Adoption in year 
01 Budget 1 
02 Staff 1 
03 Training 1 
 
 
Table 2. Output indicators 
 
Indicators Adoption in year(s) 
04 Forward planning 2-3 
05 RIA scope 1 
06 RIA extent 2-3 
07 RIA quality 4 and beyond 
08 RIA perception survey 4 and beyond 
09 Consultation scope 1 
10 Consultation extent 2-3 
11 Consultation perception survey 4 and beyond 
12 PIR scope 2-3 
13 PIR extent 4 and beyond 
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Table 3. Intermediate outcomes 
Adoption in year(s) 
Indicators Adoption in year(s) 
14 Number of laws 1 
15 Number of pages adoption not recommended 
16 Duration of law-making process adoption not recommended 
17 Perception survey citizens/firms 4 and beyond 
18 Perception survey regulators 4 and beyond 
 
Table 4. Final outcomes 
Indicators Adoption in year(s) 
19 Administrative burdens 4 and beyond 
20 Total number of lives saved 4 and beyond 
21 Total cost reduction 2-3 
Composite indicators 
Some indicators are composite measures. The RIA composite indicator is designed as weighted 
average of simple measures, which can be normalised for ease of aggregation. There are several 
suggestions for the individual components of this indicator in the scorecard used by Robert Hahn and his 
associates in the past for the US (Hahn and Dudley, 2004; Hahn and Tetlock, 2007) or, in Europe, Andrea 
Renda at the Centre for European Policy Studies (Renda, 2006). The authors of this report have scored 
some 500 RIAs in the United Kingdom using a checklist based on 93 items (Fritsch et al., 2012). For ease 
of illustration, we suggest the following fundamental components that a RIA composite measure should 
include, e.g. percentages of RIAs that: 
 Provide adequate problem definition; 
 Set the criteria for decisions (such as cost-effectiveness); 
 Consider alternative options apart from the status quo and command-and-control 
evaluation; 
 Provide a discussion of the distribution of positive and negative effects of the regulation; 
 Estimate the life-time of policy options; 
 Discuss whether rights are involved and how they were addressed in rulemaking; 
 Integrate the sustainability dimension in the assessment of options; 
 Measure compliance costs; 
 Compare/balance/commensurate costs and benefits of at least the chosen options; 
 Provide an explicit ranking of options; 
 Address implementation and enforcement issues providing information on how the 
regulation is likely to be implemented by whom and how; 
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 Discuss issues of uncertainty in estimates; 
 Contain a section on monitoring and evaluation with specific data and information; 
 Justify the absence of a review clause; 
 Include a contact name or website for making contact and providing feedback; 
 Identify net benefits of proposed option. 
Similarly, the composite indicator for extent of consultation can be drawn from the literature on 
scorecards and regulatory checklists we have just mentioned. The fundamental components should refer to 
the percentage of consultations that:  
 Respect the timetable set by the government in terms of duration of consultation; 
 Identify the sustainability dimension of the problem, and discuss whether it is relevant or 
not; 
 Justify the methods chosen to consult stakeholders; 
 Provide evidence that stakeholders were involved in the stage of identifying alternative 
options and appraising them; 
 Encourage a comprehensive appraisal of different alternative courses of actions by the 
stakeholders, including economic aspects as well as rights and sustainability; 
 Show that the general public was given a possibility to provide input to the consultation; 
 Show that the regulators addressed the issues raised by those who were consulted; 
 Provide a summary of the results of consultation. 
Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 also contain composite measures based on surveys. The recent international 
experience shows that respondents interpret very general questions about the quality of regulation with 
ambiguity. The identification of the exact wording of the individual questions of surveys of citizens and 
firms deserves a stand-alone study, and there is already a cross-national process of reflection and learning 
under way (OECD, 2010). Comparability of responses to surveys in this field is still generally low, given 
the context-bound nature of attitudes towards regulation and the problem of distinguishing perceptions of 
regulation from more diffuse beliefs in the quality of government and satisfaction with democracy. Yet 
again, we stress that there is considerable experience among practitioners and social scientists about how to 
distinguish specific from diffuse beliefs. We are not starting from scratch but the issue cannot be handled 
in a few paragraphs of this report. With regard to measures capturing the attitudes of the regulators 
ambiguity is lower, but self-serving bias and the legitimate attitude to defend the choices made by elected 
governments can create problems. A possible way forward is not to ask blunt, general questions about the 
tools but about the functions and usages of the tools, for instance whether regulatory impact assessment or 
consultation are used to achieve one goal (such as increasing the number of opinions represented in the 
process) or another. Radaelli and De Francesco (2007) provide suggestions for questions to be asked to 
regulators. 
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Oversight structures 
On oversight structures, one limitation of the indicators we suggest is that most of them are based on 
output or intermediate outcomes rather than final outcomes. More indicators are needed to assess the 
value-for-money of oversight activities. One can impossibly assess regulatory oversight bodies only in 
terms of how the tools are used or how much training is provided. It is vital to know if oversight creates a 
better regulatory environment or not. Several indicators of the quality of the environment exist, notably the 
OECD Product Market Indicators and the Doing Business Indicators. They all come with their pros and 
cons. Since the OECD has commissioned a companion paper on measuring the effects and outcomes of 
regulatory reform tools and institutions, we abstain from recommending one indicator or another from the 
set of Product Market Indicators or Doing Business. However, we wish to stress that the inclusion of at 
least some of the outcome indicators identified in the companion paper is a necessary complement to the 
set of measures needed to evaluate the performance of the regulatory oversight structure. The main 
challenge is to handle causality because one has to reject the hypothesis that improvements in the 
regulatory outcomes are not caused by factors that have nothing to do with regulatory oversight. Hence one 
has to control for a large number of plausible rival hypotheses. 
However, both future research and policy should enhance efforts to gauge the effects of oversight on a 
suitable panel of sustainability indicators.  
4. Usage 
We distinguish three different usages of indicators: management, communication and accountability: 
 Management: Central oversight bodies use indicators in order to map progress with the 
regulatory reform agenda and stimulate discussion with departments and regulatory 
agencies. Further, they alert the officers responsible for the overall regulatory reform 
agenda on where exactly progress is slower. Indicators that are 'actionable' point to the 
remedies or programme changes that would improve performance. In this report, we have 
focused on management indicators. On basis of our country survey, we believe that, for the 
time being, this is the most important type of utilisation. 
 Communication: Regulatory quality measures may become central elements of a 
communication strategy at different stages of regulatory reform. The narrative of change is 
as important as trust in the narrator. Communication should be calibrated on key narrators 
and key constituencies, for example small and medium enterprises.  
 Accountability: Actors are accountable to a variety of institutions and 'constituencies' along 
the chain of delegation. The most important end-users of regulatory reform are ministers, 
parliamentarians, and citizens. However, the literature alerts on hindrances to usage of 
regulatory indicators by these end users. 
Integrated regulatory management 
Integrated regulatory management is the most direct way of using indicators. Both the regulatory 
oversight body and the Minister responsible for regulatory reform should use indicators in order to further 
the transition towards integrated regulatory management. We stress the following implications: 
In the first year, indicators should be used to develop a baseline of regulatory reform. Using 
indicators over time matters most. Across countries but even within the same government, policy makers 
may disagree on whether having a given indicator at the 35% level is a success or a failure. Expectations 
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play a key role here. What matters, however, is whether in the second year the indicator goes up to 40% or 
drops down to 30%.  
We made a distinction between instruments, e.g. regulatory impact assessment and consultation. This 
enables policy makers to monitor where progress is being made and where progress is slow. As a 
consequence, remedies can be put in place at the level of specific instrumentations of regulatory reform. 
Since indicators track down broad dimensions and different instruments, composite measures are 
useful in order to establish an overall index of performance. Similarly, the aggregation of perception 
measures serves to produce an overall index of satisfaction with regulation. The methodological problems 
are daunting, but they have not deterred researchers and governments from discussing indexes that are, 
from a conceptual perspective, even more complicated, for instance indexes of satisfaction with democracy 
and indexes of economic freedom. In a nutshell, the message is: Do not be afraid of aggregation! 
Communication 
Surveys help gauging the gap between results achieved by the departments and their perception 
among stakeholders. Communication should be adjusted to explain the gap, and measures can be fine-
tuned over time to cross-validate objective and subjective indicators. In regulatory reform, benefits are 
diffuse in that the whole economy and the citizens benefit from an efficient and legitimate regulatory 
system. However, the cost of reform is concentrated on rent-seeking operators that can be very vocal and 
well-organised. An evidence-based communication based on shared indicators will over time create 
consensus for reform and isolate the rent-seekers. Communication should also balance targets and results 
across the electoral cycle and the different stages of reform.  
Accountability 
Regulatory indicators can be used to enhance accountability to the end-users of regulatory reform. 
Following Pollitt (2006), the end-users of reform are (in regulation as well as in other policy areas) the 
ministers, the parliamentarians and the citizens. Business is an obvious and very important end-user of 
reform programs such as the reduction of compliance costs and the war on red tape.  
 Ministers are expected to use indicators to steer oversight process and the regulatory 
oversight body, for example by changing administrative law procedures such as notice and 
comment or “giving reasons” requirements. Ministers can also steer regulatory agencies 
towards medium-terms goals although the degree of independence of regulatory agencies 
varies by country. 
 In some countries, parliaments are responsible for drawing up the statutes of regulatory 
agencies – indicators provide the basis for this long-term exercise. For example, in the US 
indicators enable Congress to review regulatory reform programs and agency actions. 
Likewise, policymakers in Denmark, Spain and Sweden use indicators in parliamentary 
hearings. In principle, select committees are well advised to use indicators on a routine 
basis, once a year. Parliamentarians, however, are less management-oriented than 
ministers. They are likely to pick up indicators to discuss controversial issues that public 
opinion brings to their attention.  
 In the ideal chain of delegation, the final end-users are citizens. They should use indicators 
to judge the public value that the government has created for them. 
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In a review of the literature in the wider field of performance measures, Pollitt (2006, p. 48) provides 
a very instructive set of caveats about accountability. He finds that “grand statements about the importance 
of performance information for democracy sit alongside extensive if patchy evidence that ministers, 
legislators, and citizens rarely make use of the volumes of performance information now thrust upon 
them”. In short, usage by end-users is a tall order. We should be realistic with our expectations.  
Yet there are good reasons to be optimistic. Institutional rules, constitutional customs, and rules of 
procedure that oblige parliamentary committees to respond to reports by audit offices are triggers of usage, 
although this can boil down to an automatic response by the committee without no real change in the 
programs. Reporting – Pollitt observes – keeps the officers focused on data and honesty (ibid.). Honesty is 
a pre-requisite for accountability. Finally, we should not expect that each and every report with regulatory 
indicators is read by all members of parliament or discussed by ordinary citizens. What matters is that the 
reports can be picked up by citizens, political parties and civil society organisations “when something 
seems to have gone seriously wrong” (ibid. 49). So, indicators are not typically used by citizens that police 
and patrol all the time, but they can be useful fire-alarms to pull when things do not seem quite right to the 
people.  
5. Learning 
These observations on end-users and accountability bring us to the fundamental point of using 
regulatory indicators in order to build capacity (for management but also for oversight) and to trigger 
learning processes. In this section, we carry on with the discussion of usage but focus on an important 
mode of utilisation: learning. 
There is a classic trade-off between oversight and learning. In order to exercise control, governments 
and regulatory oversight bodies monitor the activities of regulatory agencies and departments down to 
inspectors and those responsible for regulatory enforcement on the ground. Taken to an extreme 
consequence, a focus on monitoring destroys the potential for innovation because it creates rigidity and an 
audit obsession with measures, paper trails and documentation. On the other hand, learning requires a 
regulatory management climate where officers can experiment, use information in evolutionary ways, and 
make mistakes in order to accept 'hard lessons' and learn from their own experience. A risk-taking attitude 
and experimentation are important pre-requisites for learning, but taken to an extreme, they destroy 
accountability and the possibility to exercise legitimate democratic control on bureaucracies. Economist 
Charles Sabel (1994) was the first to highlight this trade-off – a problem that is as old as organisational 
science.  
This trade-off between learning and monitoring, however, can be eased by designing jointly the 
indicators and the processes in which they will be used. Countries that adopt indicators but do not design 
processes in which they should be used are pre-destined to failure. As we already observed, institutional 
rules compel specific actors (the Minister, the government, or a parliamentary committee) to respond to 
annual reports; often these reports contain indicators. The next step is to establish who should discuss this 
type of information, as well as when and where. An annual parliamentary session on the regulatory agenda 
of the government, similar to the annual session on the finance bill, is a strong institutional incentive to 
using indicators. There are no doubts that the finance bill discussion is a political priority on the 
institutional agenda of governments and parliaments. Equally, there is no doubt that budgetary indicators 
play a large role in structuring this discussion. Regulatory management indicators would most likely 
acquire saliency on the political agenda if countries were to move towards an annual regulatory session of 
the type suggested by Doern (2007). Annual regulatory sessions are arguably the highest level of domestic 
decision-making where regulatory management indicators should be discussed. Pollitt (2006b) has shown 
how some measures are used for oversight and (sort of) 'punishment' in Anglo-Saxon contexts, but very 
differently in Scandinavia. It follows that the institutional-political context matters in drawing the line 
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between oversight and cooperation. We cannot expect the regulatory session to be the same in every 
parliament – traditions of accountability and institutional rules will shape this session. But the essence 
should be the same everywhere, i.e. using indicators to set priorities for regulatory policy. 
There are other possible forums for learning. Looking at the relationship between the oversight unit 
and the departments, indicators can be employed to structure an annual workshop of dialogue on and 
learning about quality. Economic regulators may have their own reflective processes, fostered by the use of 
common methodologies, language and measures. Regional governments may engage in benchmarking 
drawing on common sets of indicators. In the cooperation between different ministries in countries with 
strong traditions of administrative cooperation, indicators can be used to 'tell stories and explain' rather 
than to 'punish', pointing to some experiences where numbers can be supported by case studies. Some 
venues are more appropriate 'to tell stories', others 'to exercise surveillance' – the same is true for political 
institutions. 
International organisations like the OECD and the European Commission have a key role to play in 
diffusing indicators internationally. They can be active agents of cross-national learning (see, for instance, 
De Francesco (2012) on the diffusion of regulatory impact assessment). Through the promotion of 
discussion, case studies and best practices, international organisations assist governments in choosing their 
own way in a context of convergence. Recent work by the OECD (Jacobzone et al., 2010) demonstrates 
that there are families of countries or clusters associated with different specifications of regulatory reform. 
This seems to suggest that in the near future countries may learn within their cluster and proceed along 
patterned convergence rather than uniformity. In any case, both the OECD and the European Commission 
do already possess the necessary institutional infrastructure, made up of working parties and, in the case of 
the European Commission, high level groups. There is no need to super-impose new organisational 
structures to the existing ones. It is sufficient to decide to adopt a common set of indicators and agree on an 
annual discussion on the information provided by the indicators. At the beginning, such a common set of 
indicators may only be a sub-set of the management panel we suggested. As argued previously, surveys are 
not ideal instruments to compare cross-country, so we not expect all countries to use the same type of 
survey. The annual discussion may be fostered by a combination of indicators and in-depth case studies 
that show how some outcomes were achieved.  
Equally important is to supplement indicators with matched case studies that contrast cases of success 
with cases of relative failure. This is a way to avoid bias generated by looking only at success cases. To 
illustrate, in our team we have coded 31 case studies of regulatory impact assessment from the United 
Kingdom and the European Commission to explore combinations of conditions that are sufficient to 
generate certain outcomes and usages, both desirable and undesirable. We have learned that some 
outcomes can be obtained by using two or three different causal paths. Indicators alone can impossibly 
provide this type of lesson but case studies and indicators together can clarify quite effectively. 
Going back to the notions of 'telling stories' and learning, the process we suggest for international 
organisations is not one of competitive benchmarking and league tables. Instead, we recommend exploring 
together the conditions for improvement and convergence. In this vein, one step forward is to include a set 
of regulatory indicators in every regulatory review to be carried out in the future, in order to complement 
what is now essentially a peer-review method with measures of regulatory quality.  
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NOTES
 
1. Cary Coglianese (2012), “Evaluating the Performance of Regulation and Regulatory Policy”, OLIS 
Document (GOV/RPC/MRP(2012)4). 
2. But see Cary Coglianese (2012), “Evaluating the Performance of Regulation and Regulatory Policy”, OLIS 
Document (GOV/RPC/MRP(2012)4). 
3. Cary Coglianese (2012), “Evaluating the Performance of Regulation and Regulatory Policy”, OLIS 
Document (GOV/RPC/MRP(2012)4). 
4. Cary Coglianese (2012), “Evaluating the Performance of Regulation and Regulatory Policy”, OLIS 
Document (GOV/RPC/MRP(2012)4). 
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ANNEX A. APPRAISAL OF INDICATORS 
Table A.1. Describing indicators 
01 ID 02 Name 
03 Underlying 
concept 




Brief name of 
indicator 
What is the underlying 
concept that the 
indicator makes 
operational? 
What exactly is measured through 
the indicator? 
What kind of data is to be collected 
when and by whom? 
For what kind of 
activity can the 
indicator be used? 
Input     
    
01 Budget 
Capacity for regulatory 
policy and oversight 
Budget for regulatory policy and 
oversight at departments and 
agencies 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body, based on data 
provided by departments and 
agencies. Data: budget used for staff, 
services or purchases relating to 
regulatory policy and oversight 
Management 
02 Staff 
Capacity for regulatory 
policy and oversight 
Staff for regulatory policy oversight 
at departments and agencies 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body, based on data 
provided by departments and 
agencies. Data: number of FTE staff 




Capacity for regulatory 
policy and oversight 
Number of public officials in 
departments and agencies 
participating in training on 
regulatory policy and oversight 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body, based on records of 
public and private institutions offering 
training as well as of departments and 
agencies. Data: number of public 
officials participating in training on 







See OECD 2009 for a useful overview of process indicators and their application in OECD member countries. 
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01 ID 02 Name 
03 Underlying 
concept 
04 What Is measured 05 Data collection 06 Usage 
Output     
    
04 Forward planning 
Capacity for forward 
planning 
Proportion of departments and 
agencies publishing a forward plan 
for the introduction and review of 
primary laws and subordinate 
regulations to be prepared, 
modified, reformed or repealed 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body, based on data 
provided by departments and 
agencies. Data: forward plans Accountability, 
management 
05 RIA scope Diffusion of RIA 
Percentage of policy proposals for 
primary laws and subordinate 
regulations that are subject to RIA 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body, based on data 
provided by departments and 
agencies. Data: complete lists of new, 
modified or abandoned policies 
together with information on which of 
these policies were subject to full or, if 
in existence, preliminary RIA 
Accountability, 
management 
06 RIA extent Quality of RIA 
Composite indicator measuring the 
degree to which RIAs, for both 
primary laws and subordinate 
regulations, include key items 
required by RIA guidelines 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body. Data: scorecard 
informing about the presence or 
absence of key items required by RIA 
guidelines, applied on a 
representative sample of RIAs 





07 RIA quality Quality of RIA 
Composite indicator measuring the 
degree to which RIA documents, 
for both primary laws and 
subordinate regulations, provide 
satisfactory analyses of key items 
required by RIA guidelines 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body. Data: in-depth case 
studies of a representative sample of 
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01 ID 02 Name 
03 Underlying 
concept 




Satisfaction with RIA 
Composite indicator exploring the 
belief in the evidence-based nature 
of RIA, the tool's ability to predict, 
participatory quality, pluralistic 
nature of the assessment process, 
ritualistic nature, biased nature 
When: annually. Who: consulting firm. 
Data: survey based on representative 









Percentage of policy proposals for 
primary laws and subordinate 
regulations subject to consultation 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body, based on data 
provided by departments and 
agencies. Data: complete lists of new, 
modified or abandoned policies 
together with information on which of 







Quality of consultation 
Composite indicator measuring the 
degree to which consultations, for 
both primary laws and subordinate 
regulations, comply with 
consultation guidelines 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body. Data: scorecard 
informing about the presence or 
absence of key items required by 
consultation guidelines, applied on a 
representative sample of 
consultations carried out by 
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01 ID 02 Name 
03 Underlying 
concept 






Composite indicator based on 
survey questions exploring 
consultee and regulators' 
satisfaction with consultation and 
their belief in the learning quality of 
consultation, i.e. participation 
patterns, value of consultation for 
regulatees, impact of consultation 
on policy options considered 
When: annually. Who: consulting firm. 
Data: survey based on representative 




12 PIR scope Diffusion of PIR 
Percentage of primary laws and 
subordinate regulations for which a 
post-implementation review was 
carried out and can be related to 
the initial RIA 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body, based on data 
provided by departments and 
agencies. Data: complete lists of new, 
modified or abandoned policies 
together with information on which of 
these policies were subject to PIR 
Accountability, 
management 
13 PIR extent Quality of PIR 
Percentage of post-implementation 
reviews for primary laws and 
subordinate regulations that pass a 
quality standard and therefore are 
not perfunctory, standards reflect 
standards of analysis developed for 
RIAs 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body. Data: scorecard 
informing about the presence or 
absence of key items required by PIR 
guidelines, applied on a 
representative sample of PIRs 
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01 ID 02 Name 
03 Underlying 
concept 
04 What is measured 05 Data collection 06 Usage 
Intermediate outcome         
14 Number of laws Quantity of regulation 
Number of primary laws and 
subordinate regulations and 
regulations introduced in the 
current year 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body, based on data 
provided by Ministry of Justice, 
Cabinet Office and agencies. Data: 
number of primary laws or 
subordinate regulations introduced in 
the current year 
Communication, 
management 
15 Number of pages Quantity of regulation 
Number of pages of primary laws 
and subordinate regulations 
introduced in the current year 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body, based on data 
provided by Ministry of Justice, 
Cabinet Office and agencies. Data: 
number of pages in primary laws or 
subordinate regulations introduced in 








Speed of legislative process in 
days from tabling the bill to 
approval, primary laws only 
There are research teams with data 
on duration of law making in different 
countries but this is not an indicator 







Satisfaction with the 
regulatory system, 
burdens, regulations, 
and impact of 
regulation 
Composite indicator based on a 
number of survey questions 
exploring the degree of 
unnecessary information 
obligations, costs related to 
compliance with regulations, 
constantly changing legislation and 
rules, awareness of burden 
reduction initiatives, and the user-
friendliness of procedures 
When: annually. Who: consulting firm. 
Data: survey based on representative 
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01 ID 02 Name 
03 Underlying 
concept 




Satisfaction with trend 
in adversarial legalism, 
responsive nature of 
regulation, access to 
regulatory justice, and 
the overall complexity 
of regulation 
Composite indicator based on a 
number of survey questions 
exploring the level of litigation, 
responsiveness of regulators, and 
access to justice to regulatees 
When: annually. Who: consulting firm. 
Data: survey based on representative 
sample of regulators 
Communication, 
management 
Final outcome   





Annual rate of reduction of 
administrative burdens per 
department and in total, absolute 
and in per cent 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body, based on information 
provided by department. Data: 
calculations provided in RIAs or 





Total number of 
lives saved 
Number of lives saved 
Total number of lives saved as a 
result of new primary laws or 
subordinate regulations introduced 
in the current year 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body. Data: calculations 







Total cost reduction 
Total net cost reduction in the 
current year resulting from various 
types of simplification activities 
divided by the value of the previous 
year 
When: annually. Who: regulatory 
oversight body. Data: calculations 
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Table A.2. Assessing indicators 






What costs accrue due 
to data collection and 
measurement? 
On which normative and 
causal assumptions does this 
indicator rest? 
Does the indicator measure what 
it is supposed to measure, i.e. 
internal validity? Can we 
generalise, i.e. external validity? 
Would the indicator provide the 
same measures when used 
repeatedly under the same 
conditions with the same subjects 
(reliability)? 
To what extent can the 
indicator be used for 





          
01 Budget 
Low. The data can 
easily be extracted from 
governmental or 
departmental budgets. 
Minor costs accrue 
through the aggregation 
of this data across 
department and 
agencies. 
First, assumes that budget is 
causally related to good 
regulatory policy and 
oversight, i.e. the higher the 
budget the better the 
regulatory policy and 
oversight. Second, assumes 
that budget is an indicator of 
willingness to engage in 
regulatory policy and 
oversight. 
Assumption 1: plausible. 
Assumption 2: less plausible 
because factors such as health of 
state budget and other economic 
constraints are disregarded. 
However, careful analyses can 
help to control for potential bias. 
Reliability: high, it is an 
unambiguous figure. Internal 
validity: low as the amount of 
budget says little about the 
effective and efficient use of those 
funds. 
Comparability is high for 
comparisons over time but 
low for comparisons across 
countries. This is because 
countries vary with regard 
to budget available for 
regulatory policy and 
oversight. 
In year 1 
02 Staff 
Low. The data can 
easily be extracted from 
governmental or 
departmental work 
plans. Minor costs 
accrue through the 
aggregation of this data 
across department and 
agencies. 
First, assumes that more staff 
is causally related to good 
regulatory policy and 
oversight, i.e. the more staff 
the better the regulatory policy 
and oversight. Second, 
assumes that staff is an 
indicator of willingness to 
engage in regulatory policy 
and oversight. 
Assumption 1: plausible. 
Assumption 2: less plausible 
because factors such as health of 
state budget and other economic 
constraints are disregarded. 
However, careful analyses can 
help to control for potential bias. 
Reliability: high, it is an 
unambiguous figure. Internal 
validity: medium, the number of 
staff says little about the 
qualification, motivation and 
performance of staff. 
Comparability is high for 
comparisons over time but 
low for comparisons across 
countries. This is because 
countries vary with regard 
to budget and human 
resources available for 
regulatory policy and 
oversight. 
In year 1 
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03 Training 
Low. The data can 
easily be extracted from 
governmental or 
departmental work 
plans. Minor costs 
accrue through the 
aggregation of this data 
across department and 
agencies. 
First, assumes that more 
training is causally related to 
good regulatory policy and 
oversight, i.e. the more 
training the better the 
regulatory policy and 
oversight. Second, assumes 
that training is an indicator of 
willingness to engage in 
regulatory policy and 
oversight. Third, assumes that 
regulator perceptions can be 
significantly modified by 
training. 
Assumption 1: plausible. 
Assumption 2: less plausible 
because factors such as health of 
state budget and other economic 
constraints are disregarded. 
However, careful analyses can 
help to control for potential bias. 
Assumption 3: plausible although 
there is evidence that regulators 
operate in specific regulatory 
cultures whose core assumptions 
and rationales are difficult to 
change. Reliability: high, it is an 
unambiguous figure. Internal 
validity: medium, the extent of 
training says little about the 
effects of training. 
Comparability is high for 
comparisons over time but 
low for comparisons across 
countries. This is because 
countries vary with regard 
to budget and human 
resources available for 
regulatory policy and 
oversight. Furthermore, 
countries differ in terms of 
the skills that are 
represented in the civil 
service (generalists are 
preferred to discipline-
trained officers in countries 
like the UK). 






See OECD 2009 for a useful overview of process indicators and their application in OECD member countries 
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01 ID 02 Name 07 Costs 08 Assumptions 09 Appraisal 10 Comparability 11 Priority 




Low. It is easy to 
establish whether 
departments and 
agencies use forward 
plans. 
First, assumes that forward 
planning is a prerequisite for 
effective regulation. Second, 
assumes that, thanks to 
departmental or agency-level 
forward plans, government or 
the regulatory oversight body 
are able to steer the legislative 
and regulatory output in a way 
compatible with regulatory 
policies. 
Assumption 1 collides with claims 
according to which regulation 
should be more flexible and 
reflexive. Assumption 2 is 
plausible yet there is doubt 
whether domestic policy making 
can fully be planned ahead on 
basis of such plans, in particular 
for countries which are members 
of a supranational organisation 
such as the EU. Generally, it is 
good to encourage departments 
and agencies to communicate 
their plans but they have to be 
comprehensive, transparent, and 
informative for policy makers to 
make use of them.  
High on both. This indicator 
consists of one 
unambiguous figure 
In years 2-3 
05 RIA scope 








together with a 
repository of RIAs for 
primary laws and 
subordinate 
regulations, provide the 
basis for the 
measurement of this 
indicator 
First, assumes that a RIA 
system is the better, the more 
complete and comprehensive 
it is, i.e. the more regulations it 
covers. Regulatory 
interventions enable or restrict 
individual and corporate action 
in a given jurisdiction and are 
related to societal costs and 
benefits. In that sense, 
regulation as well as non-
regulation require public 
justification based on a careful 
analysis of their impacts. 
These analyses are provided 
in RIAs. This logic is 
undermined if regulation is 
only selectively subject to RIA. 
While the assumption is plausible 
as such, it is in contradiction to 
calls for target-oriented analyses, 
i.e. to carry out RIAs only if policy 
proposals imply high costs or 
suggest severe impacts (for 
instance, the fact that a country 
does not carry out RIAs for low-
impact regulations is less 
problematic than omissions with 
regard to interventions with 
severe impacts; hence low figures 
of this indicator do not necessarily 
indicate a weakly implemented 
RIA system). Further, there is a 
certain degree of ambiguity with 
regard to what types of pre-
legislative analysis qualify as RIA; 
one minimal definition would be: 
all explanatory memoranda. High 
scores on validity and reliability.  
High on both. This indicator 
consists of one 
unambiguous figure. Cross-
national comparisons need, 
however, to keep in mind 
the fact that countries differ 
in whether they carry out 
RIAs for primary laws or 
subordinate regulations or 
for both. 
In year 1 
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06 RIA extent 
High. Scoring RIAs is a 
time-consuming 
activity, the more so the 
higher the number of 
obligatory items in the 
RIA guidelines, i.e. the 
scorecard. Further, the 
quality of this indicator 
relies to a large extent 
on the number of RIAs 
scored – the higher the 
better, and, if only a 
sample of the full 
universe of RIAs is 
assessed, on the 
statistical 
representativeness of 
that sample. If a high 
representativeness can 
be achieved, costs 
might be lower. 
First, assumes that a RIA 
system is the better, the more 
complete its analyses are. 
Regulatory interventions 
enable or restrict individual 
and corporate action in a 
given jurisdiction and are 
related to societal costs and 
benefits. In that sense, 
regulation as well as non-
regulation require public 
justification based on a careful 
analysis of their impacts. 
These analyses are provided 
in RIAs. This logic is 
undermined if such analyses 
are carried out superficially, 
rest on a weak data basis, 
employ disputed methods or 
omit specific tests entirely. 
Second, assumes that the 
presence of specific analyses 
is a satisfactory proxy for good 
quality of such analyses. 
Assumption 1 is plausible, 
Assumption 2 to a lesser degree: 
The logic behind the scorecard 
approach is that, in absence of a 
replication of the actual analyses 
conducted in a RIA, information 
on the completeness of analyses 
in a RIA is a sufficient proxy for 
the quality of such analyses. This 
logic has certainly its flaws as this 
approach might invite ticking the 
boxes rather than doing high-
quality analyses. Still, it is 
probably the best measurement 
which is both cost-effective and 
relatively internally valid. Instead, 
the external validity of this 
indicator is medium only unless 
oversight bodies ensure a high 
intercoder reliability through 
training sessions on how to 
assess the quality of a RIA, clear 
guidelines or, preferably, a 
specific team with little personnel 
turnover dedicated to RIA 
assessment. Further, there is 
wide disagreement whether 
specific interventions require a 
justification at all (e.g. should we 
care about impacts on gender 
relations?) or a sufficiently 
significance to deserve a RIA 
(e.g. minor secondary regulation 
with limited anticipated impacts). 
Hence, countries differ with 
regard to which tests and checks 
are obligatory at all and, even if 
two countries use similar RIA 
guidelines, might use different 
systems of weighing scorecard 
items during the calculation of a 
composite measure of RIA quality. 
Medium on both. As long 
as clear definitions of 
scorecard items are 
provided, the analysis is 
largely replicable and 
therefore enables relatively 
reliable comparisons 
across years and countries. 
However, so far there are 
no universal standards 
when it comes to defining 
what a 'good' or 'complete' 
RIA is. Consequently, 
cross-country comparability 
suffers from different 
scorecards and codebooks 
as well as varying 
understandings and 
definitions of specific 
scorecard items. Further, 
this compound indicator 
relies on some form of 
aggregation and countries 
might use different 
approaches to weigh 
scorecard items. 
Comparability across time 
within a jurisdiction might 
suffer from changing RIA 
guidelines. 
In years 2-3 
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07 RIA quality 
High. Producing high-
quality case studies is a 
time-consuming 
activity. In order to 
challenge the analyses 
carried out in a RIA, 
independent expertise 
and data are needed 
that come at additional 
costs. 
First, assumes that a RIA 
system is the better, the more 
complete its analyses are. 
Regulatory interventions 
enable or restrict individual 
and corporate action in a 
given jurisdiction and are 
related to societal costs and 
benefits. In that sense, 
regulation as well as non-
regulation require public 
justification based on a careful 
analysis of their impacts. 
These analyses are provided 
in RIAs. This logic is 
undermined if such analyses 
are carried out superficially, 
rest on a weak data basis, 
employ disputed methods or 
omit specific tests entirely. 
Second, assumes that 
generalists in regulatory 
oversight body possess the 
necessary expertise to 
challenge analyses presented 
in a RIA. 
Assumption 1 is plausible, 
assumption 2 to a lesser degree 
but still this indicator is superior to 
“RIA extent”: The scorecard 
approach (discussed for “RIA 
extent”) only checks for the 
presence and absence of 
scorecard items, i.e. obligatory 
checks and analyses to be carried 
out in a RIA, without assessing 
the quality of these checks and 
test. This indicator attempts to 
assess the quality of RIA 
analyses as such. This approach 
is extremely resource-intensive 
(time, staff, funding) and it is 
questionable to what extent an 
independent replication, perhaps 
resting on new data, can actually 
be carried out; in particular with 
regard to the technical 
competences of officers working 
in oversight bodies. However, 
overall this is the most advanced 
and in-depth method to assess 
whether regulators comply with 
established RIA standards. 
Low on both. In addition to 
the shortcomings 
discussed for RIA extent, 
there are virtually no 
standards what a 'good' 
analysis is. Due to different 
professional, disciplinary or 
theoretical backgrounds, 
there are different notions 
of 'good' analysis which are 
likely to prevent such 
standards and 
comparability of this 
indicator over time and 
across countries. In year 4 and 
beyond 
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Medium. Costs accrue 
mainly due to the 
creation of a large 
sample size and efforts 
to extract a 
representative sample. 
 
First, assumes a direct 
link between quality of 
RIA and regulatee 
perceptions, in contrast 
to factors such as 
organisational reputation 
or specific societal 
perceptions of 
legitimacy. Second, 
assumes that regulatees 
are willing to assess RIA 
independently from their 
desire to reduce or 
increase the level of 
regulation as such. 
Assumption 1: it is dangerous to 
overestimate the effect of 
regulatory policies on perceptions 
held as there are various 
intervening factors outside the 
realm of domestic legislators. 
Assumption 2: regulators may bias 
their responses to defend the 
government policy. Measurement 
of perceptions is sensitive to 
wording, sampling issues and how 
the questionnaire is administered. 
External validity is low in the case 
of focus groups and higher with 
representative samples. Citizens 
may confuse their satisfaction with 
regulation with their overall 
satisfaction with the political or 
economic system. Measurement of 
perceptions is sensitive to wording, 
sampling issues and how the 
questionnaire is administered, so 
there might be normative issues 
when drafting or reading survey 
questions.  
Low on both. 
Comparability across 
time suffers from 
perceptions being partly 
influenced by external 
events that can hardly 
be controlled by 
regulators. Cross-
country comparisons are 
inadequate as beliefs 
and expectations 
depend on regulatory 
culture. 
In year 4 and 
beyond 
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countries do already 
possess governmental 
or parliamentary 
registers that inform 
about past regulatory 
and legislative activities. 
Those registers, 
together with a 
repository of 
consultations 
undertaken for primary 
laws and subordinate 
regulations, provide the 
basis for the 
measurement of this 
indicator. Producing and 
taking care of such a 
repository involves 
some costs, however. 
First, assumes that a 
regulatory system is the 
better, the more it 
consults regulatees. 
Consultations bring in 
local knowledge, sectoral 
expertise and highlight 
sectoral interests to the 
regulatory process. This 
logic, as well as the ones 
presented in the 
following, is undermined 
if regulators consult 
selectively only. Second, 
assumes that there is no 
contradiction between 
participatory elements in 
regulation and more 
representative forms of 
democracy, i.e. that 
consultation adds 
legitimacy to the 
regulatory process either 
through direct contact of 
regulators and 
regulatees or because it 
attempts to level out 
uneven capacities to 
lobby decision makers. 
Third, assumes that 
consultation enhances 
implementation because 
new regulation is closer 
to regulatee interests or 
because regulatees are 
informed well in 
advanced about 
upcoming policies or 
because the regulatory 
process is perceived as 
fair (procedural justice). 
The assumptions are plausible and 
have been confirmed by 
researchers although in cases 
there is a danger of regulatory 
capture: Stakeholders may identify 
options that provide rents rather 
than profits/efficiency. Well-
balanced consultations across all 
societal groups and sectors 
compensate this. However, there is 
some kind of tension between 
public consultations and more 
representative forms of democracy 
as organised stakeholders are 
favoured over the general public. 
High scores on validity and 
reliability. The general call for more 
consultations is in contradiction to 
calls for target-oriented analyses, 
i.e. to consult only if policy 
proposals imply high costs or 
suggest severe impacts (for 
instance, the fact that a country 
does consult on low-impact 
regulations is less problematic than 
omissions with regard to 
interventions with severe impacts; 
hence low figures of this indicator 
do not necessarily indicate a 
weakly implemented consultation 
system). Further, there is a certain 
degree of ambiguity with regard to 
what types of involvement count as 
consultation.  
High on both. This 




however, to keep in mind 
the fact that countries 
differ in whether they 
consult on primary laws 
or subordinate 
regulations or for both. 
In year 1 
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Medium. The quality of 
this indicator relies to a 
large extent on the 
number of consultations 
assessed scored – the 
higher the better, and, if 
only a sample of the full 
universe of 
consultations is 
assessed, on the 
statistical 
representativeness of 
that sample. If a high 
representativeness can 
be achieved, costs 
might be lower. 
First, assumes that a 
regulatory system is the 




are assumed to provide 







extent”). This logic is 
undermined if 
consultations are carried 
out superficially, unfairly, 
or remain without impact 
on the policy process. 
The assumptions are plausible and 
have been confirmed by 
researchers although in cases 
there is a danger of regulatory 
capture: Stakeholders may identify 
options that provide rents rather 
than profits/efficiency. Well-
balanced consultations across all 
societal groups and sectors 
compensate this. However, there is 
some kind of tension between 
public consultations and more 
representative forms of democracy 
as organised stakeholders are 
favoured over the general public. 
The scorecard approach has 
certainly its flaws as it might invite 
ticking the boxes rather than doing 
high-quality analyses. Still, it is 
probably the best measurement 
which is both cost-effective and 
relatively internally valid. Instead, 
the external validity of this indicator 
is medium only unless oversight 
bodies ensure a high intercoder 
reliability through training sessions 
on how to assess the quality of 
consultations, clear guidelines or, 
preferably, a specific team with 
little personnel turnover dedicated 
to assessing consultations. 
Number of participants does not 
reflect quality of participation. 
Medium on both. As long 
as clear definitions of 
scorecard items are 
provided, the analysis is 




years and countries. 
However, so far there 
are no universal 
standards when it comes 




suffers from different 
scorecards as well as 
varying understandings 
and definitions of 
specific scorecard items. 
Further, this composite 
indicator relies on some 
form of aggregation and 
countries might use 
different approaches to 
weigh scorecard items. 
Comparability across 
time within a jurisdiction 
might suffer from 
changing consultation 
guidelines; however, this 
can be controlled for. 
In years 2-3 
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Medium. Costs accrue 
mainly due to the 
creation of a large 
sample size and efforts 
to extract a 
representative sample. 
First, assumes a direct 
link between quality of 
consultation and 
regulatee perceptions, in 
contrast to factors such 
as organisational 
reputation or specific 
societal perceptions of 
legitimacy. Second, 
assumes that regulatees 
are willing to assess 
consultations 
independently from their 
desire to reduce or 
increase the level of 
regulation as such. 
Assumption 1: it is dangerous to 
overestimate the effect of 
regulatory policies and perceptions 
held as there are various 
intervening factors outside the 
realm of domestic legislators. 
Assumption 2: regulators may bias 
their responses to defend the 
government policy. External validity 
is low in the case of focus groups 
and higher with representative 
samples. Citizens may confuse 
their satisfaction with regulation 
with their overall satisfaction with 
the political or economic system. 
Measurement of perceptions is 
sensitive to wording, sampling 
issues and how the questionnaire 
is administered, so there might be 
normative issues when drafting or 
reading survey questions. The fact 
that a firm in the sample did not 
participate in consultation may 
simply indicate that there were no 
regulatory changes in the firms' 
sector – with implications for 
validity and reliability. 
Low on both. 
Comparability across 
time suffers from 
perceptions being partly 
influenced by external 
events that can hardly 
be controlled by 
regulators. Cross-
country comparisons are 
inadequate as beliefs 
and expectations 
depend on regulatory 
culture. 
In year 4 and 
beyond 
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12 PIR scope 
Medium. Many 
countries do already 
possess governmental 
or parliamentary 
registers that inform 
about past regulatory 
and legislative activities. 
Those registers, 
together with a 
repository of RIAs and 
PIRs undertaken for 
primary laws and 
subordinate regulations, 
provide the basis for the 
measurement of this 
indicator. Producing and 
taking care of such a 
repository for PIRs 
involves some costs, 
however. 
First, assumes that a 
PIR system is the better, 
the more complete and 
comprehensive it is, i.e. 
the more regulations it 
covers. Regulatory 
interventions enable or 
restrict individual and 
corporate action in a 
given jurisdiction and are 
related to societal costs 
and benefits. In that 
sense, regulation as well 
as non-regulation require 
public justification based 
on a careful analysis of 
their impacts. PIRs 
reanalyse the analyses 
provided in RIAs. This 
logic is undermined if 
regulation is only 
selectively subject to 
PIR. 
While the assumption is plausible 
as such, it is in contradiction to 
calls for target-oriented analyses, 
i.e. to carry out PIRs only if policy 
proposals implied high costs or 
suggested severe impacts (for 
instance, the fact that a country 
does not carry out PIRs for low-
impact regulations is less 
problematic than omissions with 
regard to interventions with severe 
impacts; hence low figures of this 
indicator do not necessarily 
indicate a weakly implemented PIR 
system). Further, there is a certain 
degree of ambiguity with regard to 
what types of ex-post analyses 
qualify as PIR. High scores on 
validity and reliability.  
This indicator consists of 
one unambiguous figure. 
Cross-national 
comparisons need, 
however, to keep in mind 
the fact that countries 
differ in whether they 
carry out PIRs for 
primary laws or 
subordinate regulations 
or for both. Furthermore, 
some countries produce 
a lot of RIAs and some 
much less. If PIRs 
always relate to 
previously produced 
RIAs, this has 
implications for the 
number of PIRs 
produced. 
In year 2-3 
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13 PIR extent 
High. Scoring PIRs is a 
time-consuming activity, 
the more so the higher 
the number of checklist 
items. Further, the 
quality of this indicator 
relies to a large extent 
on the number of PIRs 
scored – the higher the 
better, and, if only a 
sample of the full 
universe of PIRs is 
assessed, on the 
statistical 
representativeness of 
that sample. If a high 
representativeness can 
be achieved, costs 
might be lower. 
First, assumes that a 
PIR system is the better, 
the more complete its 
analyses are. PIRs are 
assumed to provide 
benefits in terms of 
policy effectiveness and 
policy learning from past 
mistakes. This logic is 
undermined if such 
analyses are carried out 
superficially, rest on a 
weak data basis, employ 
disputed methods or 
omit specific tests 
entirely. 
Assumption 1: plausible. The logic 
behind the scorecard approach is 
that, in absence of a replication of 
the actual analyses conducted in a 
PIR, information on the 
completeness of analyses in a PIR 
is a sufficient proxy for the quality 
of such analyses (for a discussion, 
see above “RIA extent”). However, 
intercoder reliability is even lower 
than for RIAs as there are no 
established standards at all of what 
a good PIR is. 
As long as clear 
definitions of scorecard 
items are provided, the 
analysis is largely 
replicable and therefore 
enables reliable 
comparisons across 
years and countries. 
However, so far there 
are no universal 
standards regarding 
what a 'good' or 
'complete' PIR is. 
Consequently, cross-
country comparability 
suffers from different 
scorecards and 
codebooks and varying 
understandings of 
specific scorecard items. 
Further, this indicator 
relies on some form of 
aggregation and 
countries might use 
different approaches to 
weigh scorecard items. 
Comparability across 
time within a jurisdiction 
might suffer from 
changing PIR guidelines. 
Main obstacle for 
comparisons: infrequent 
use of PIRs to date. 
In year 4 and 
beyond 
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Low. Most countries 
produce overview 
documents, at least for 
internal use, which 
provide this kind of 
information. 
First, assumes that less 
regulation is better than 
more regulation. 
Assumption 1: can be challenged, 
many state and non-state actors 
believe that quality is more 
important than quantity. Reliability: 
high, unambiguous figure. Internal 
validity: high, assuming that one is 
really interested in the quantity of 
regulation. Further, the quantity of 
regulation is partly determined by 
supranational actors such as the 
EU and thus partly out of control 
for domestic decision makers or 
the regulatory oversight body. 




however, suffer from 
differences across 
countries to introduce 
new legislation through 
the amendment of 
existing bills, the 
introduction of new bills 
amending existing bills, 
or the introduction of 
secondary law to amend 
existing bills. 
Furthermore, 
membership in regional 
organisations such as 
the EU might have an 
impact on regulatory 
productivity that cannot 
be attributed to domestic 
decision makers. 








at least for internal use, 
which could be the 
basis for calculating this 
indicator. 
First, assumes that less 
regulation is better than 
more regulation. 
Assumption 1: can be challenged, 
many state and non-state actors 
believe that quality is more 
important than quantity. Reliability: 
high, unambiguous figure. Internal 
validity: high, assuming that one is 
really interested in the quantity of 
regulation. Further, the quantity of 
regulation is partly determined by 
supranational actors such as the 
EU and thus partly out of control 
for domestic decision makers or 
the regulatory oversight body. 




suffer from variance in 
terms of legislative style 
and style of legal 
language. Furthermore, 
membership in regional 
organisations such as 
the EU might have an 
impact on regulatory 
productivity that cannot 
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legislative speed are 
easy to make. However, 
reliable measurements 
that control for a 
number of external 
factors require a lot of 
contextual information 
and expertise that 
comes at high costs. 
First, assumes that fast 
decision-making 
processes are better 
than slower ones. 
Second, assumes that 
speed of decision 
making is not correlated 
with quality of decision 
making. 
Assumption 1: plausible. 
Assumption 2: contested, good law 
making may take time, in particular 
if the involvement of experts and 
stakeholders is required, implying 
that reduction of the law-making 
process can come at the expense 
of quality of regulation or limited 
opportunities for RIA and 
consultation. Furthermore, this 
indicator suffers from serious 
problems related to controlling 
intervening variables.  




challenges with regard to 
controlling for political, 
constitutional, and legal 
characteristics of a 
specific jurisdiction, i.e. 






organisations such as 
the EU introduces an 
additional bias as some 
countries are no 
members at all while 
others may want to 
implement fast or delay 
legislation for domestic 
reasons. Comparisons 
over time within one 
jurisdiction still face the 
challenge of controlling 
for external factors such 
as strength of opposition 
parties and changed 
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Medium. Costs accrue 
mainly due to the 
creation of a large 
sample size and efforts 
to extract a 
representative sample. 
First, assumes that 
business interests 
adequately represent 
public interests, i.e. that 
the self-interest of 
business actors does not 
stand in contrast to the 
general interest. Second, 
assumes a direct link 
between regulatory 
activities and regulatee 
perceptions. 
Assumption 1: business surveys 
focus on one particular stakeholder 
group, thereby raising normative 
questions related to legitimacy and 
representation. After all, many 
policies aim at benefitting a wider 
group of regulatees, i.e. in health, 
social or environmental politics. 
Focusing on business interest 
might therefore bias overall 
perceptions or even conflict with 
more general policy goals. Surveys 
that include citizens may 
compensate this. Assumption 2: 
one should not overestimate the 
effect of regulatory policies on 
perceptions held as there are 
various intervening factors outside 
the realm of domestic legislators. 
Reliability: varies, depending how 
representative the sample is. 
External validity: low in the case of 
focus groups and high with 
representative samples. Internal 
validity: medium, citizens may 
confuse their satisfaction with 
regulation with their overall 
satisfaction with the political or 
economic system. Measurement of 
perceptions is sensitive to wording, 
sampling issues and how the 
questionnaire is administered, so 
there might be normative issues 
when drafting or reading survey 
questions.  
Comparisons over time 
are reliable although 
regulatory culture and 
beliefs held on regulation 
might change over time 
as well. Cross-country 






different perceptions of 
regulators when it comes 
to regulatory activities 
and reform. For 
example, countries with 
different regulatory 
cultures might achieve 
high satisfaction rates 
although these rates are 
the result of very 
different regulatory 
activities. 
In year 4 and 
beyond 
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Medium. Costs accrue 
mainly due to the 
creation of a large 
sample size and efforts 
to extract a 
representative sample. 
First, assumes that 
regulators are cognitively 
able and willing to 
assess regulation, and 
thereby their own work, 
in an objective way. 
Assumption 1: contested as it is 
likely that regulators may bias their 
responses to defend the 
government policy, their 
organisation or specific tools like 
RIA. Reliability: varies, depending 
how representative the sample is. 
External validity: low in the case of 
focus groups and high with 
representative samples. 
Measurement of perceptions is 
sensitive to wording, sampling 
issues and how the questionnaire 
is administered, so there might be 
normative issues when drafting or 
reading survey questions. 
Comparisons over time 
are reliable although 
regulatory culture and 
beliefs held about 
regulation might change 
over time as well. Cross-
country comparisons 
suffer from competing 




different perceptions of 
regulatees when it 
comes to regulatory 
activities and reform. For 
example, countries with 
different regulatory 
cultures might achieve 
high satisfaction rates 
although these rates are 
the result of very 
different regulatory 
activities. 
In year 4 and 
beyond 
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Medium. Costs may be 
low if data are extracted 
from the RIAs. The 
Standard Cost Model, 
however, is more cost-
intensive as it involves 
surveys, interviews with 
regulatees and related 
tools. 
First, assumes that by 
reducing information 
obligations the benefits 
of the regulation remain 
intact. Second, assumes 
total compliance with 
administrative 
requirements. 
Assumption 1: less plausible, 
burden reductions can come at the 
expense of decreased policy 
effectiveness. This assumption 
touches upon normative issues: 
There is the political risk of tilting 
regulatory reform towards only one 
stakeholder, that is, the firm. 
Assumption 2: relies on unrealistic 
assumptions on compliance, 
thereby introducing a bias when it 
comes to calculating costs. 
Reliability: varies, depending how 
representative the sample is. 
Internal validity: varies, depending 
on the type of the Standard Cost 
Model used. Generally low as, first, 
point estimates are often less 
informative than probabilistic 
ranges. Second, administrative 
burdens are only a component of 
direct costs. The other important 
component is compliance cost. The 
risk is one of focusing the public 
debate on a limited type of 
regulatory costs. As such this is not 
a net indicator although the 
indicator can be improved by 
keeping a live baseline. Indicator 
21 is more robust and contains 
more information. We therefore 
suggest “Total cost reduction” 
instead of this indicator.  
Comparability over time 
is high yet the indicator 
is of little use in cross-
country comparisons. 
This is because we do 
not control for the 
direction and entity of 
bias in individual settings 
and countries. However, 
improvements in 
standardisation of 
measurement is taking 
place via OECD work 
and the SCM 
international network of 
adopters and developers 
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20 
Total number 
of lives saved 
Low. If data are 
extracted from the RIAs 
First, assumes that 
number of lives saved is 
an adequate indicator for 
effectiveness of 
regulation. 
Assumption 1: plausible. Reliability: 
low, RIAs may provide less reliable 
data, hence PIR data may provide 
more leverage. Internal validity: 
contested, there are normative 
issues concerning measuring life 
and its value, in particular with 
regard to distinguishing lives, life 
years or quality life years. Internal 
and external validity: high. 
Comparability over time 
within one jurisdiction is 
high as long as the same 
value for life 
measurements is used. 
Comparability across 
countries is weak: So far 
there are great variations 









Low. If data are 
extracted from the RIAs 
First, assumes that by 
reducing costs the 
benefits of the regulation 
remain intact. Second, 
assumes total 
compliance with 
regulatory or legal 
requirements. 
Assumption 1: less plausible, cost 
reductions can come at the 
expense of decreased policy 
effectiveness. Assumption 2: relies 
on unrealistic assumptions on 
compliance, thereby introducing a 
bias when it comes to calculating 
costs. Reliability: low, RIAs may 
provide less reliable data, hence 
PIR data may provide more 
leverage. Cost reductions will have 
to be validated by surveys to make 
the claim that they are felt on the 
ground. Internal and external 
validity: high. 
High on both. Very high 
if compared over time. 
Comparisons across 
countries are high as 
well although one should 
keep in mind that 
countries start at 
different baselines. In year 2-3 
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Table A.3. Applications of indicators and references 
01 ID 02 Name 12 Countries 13 References 
Identifier of 
indicator 
Brief name of indicator 
Examples of countries that have 
already used this indicator 
Where can one find more conceptual or practical information about this 
indicator? 
Input 
    
01 Budget Most EU countries Radaelli De Francesco 2007, EVIA 2008, De Francesco et al. 2012 
02 Staff Most EU countries Radaelli De Francesco 2007, EVIA 2008, De Francesco et al. 2012 
03 Training 
Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Poland, Portugal, United 
Kingdom, United States 
De Francesco et al. 2012 
Process   
  Process indicators See OECD 2009 for a useful overview of process indicators and their application in OECD member countries. 
Output     
04 Forward planning Australia, New Zealand 
On Australia, see Office of Best Practice Regulation 2009. For a general 
discussion, see Jacobs 2009. 
05 RIA scope Australia, New Zealand, Sweden On Australia, see Office of Best Practice Regulation 2009. 
06 RIA extent 
Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, United States 
On Australia, see Office of Best Practice Regulation 2009. The United Kingdom 
has published assessments of RIA quality in National Audit Office 2004, 2005, 
2006a, 2007a, 2009, 2010 and, more recently, in Regulatory Policy Committee 
2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012. The US assesses the impacts of new regulation 
with a focus on administrative burdens and economic impacts only; see Office 
of Management and Budget 2009, 2010, 2011. Fritsch et al. 2012 compare the 
quality of RIA in the EU and the UK. Cecot et al. 2008 compare the EU and the 
US. Hahn, Lutter and Viscusi 2000, Hahn and Tetlock 2007, and Hahn and 
Dudley 2004 research the quality of pre-legislative assessment in the US. 
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07 RIA quality 
New Zealand, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
On New Zealand, see NZIER 2009, Legislation Advisory Committee 2008, 
2010, 2011. For Sweden, see Swedish Better Regulation Council 2011. The 
UK has also carried out a number of case studies, see Regulatory Policy 
Committee 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, and National Audit Office 2007a. 
08 RIA perception survey 
European Commission, United 
Kingdom 
For the UK, see National Audit Office (2010). The Evaluation Partnership 
(2007) conducted surveys and interviews with officials at EU level. Further, 
Canada commissioned a similar study more than ten years ago (Regulatory 
Consulting Group and Delphi Group 2000). 
09 Consultation scope    
10 Consultation extent 
Australia, New Zealand, United 
Kingdom 
For Australia, see Office of Best Practice Regulation 2009 and Carroll 2007. 
Further, the Productivity Commission (2010) calculates the numbers of 
stakeholder submissions received, hence providing a quantitative measure. 
Other countries such as the United Kingdom (National Audit Office 2007a, 
2010) or New Zealand (NZIER 2009) use information provided in RIAs in order 
to draw conclusions about the quality of consultation. 
11 Consultation perception survey 
    
12 PIR scope New Zealand, United Kingdom For the UK, see National Audit Office 2009. 
13 PIR extent United Kingdom For the UK, see National Audit Office 2009. 
Intermediate outcome     
14 Number of laws 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
New Zealand, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
For Sweden, see Regeringskansliet 2010. In the UK, see Law Commission 
2006. 
15 Number of pages United Kingdom For the UK, see Law Commission 2006. 
16 Duration of law-making process   
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17 
Perception survey citizens and 
firms 
Australia, Canada, Netherlands, 
Spain, United Kingdom, United 
States 
For Australia see Ipsos-Eureka 2009, for Belgium see Kegels 2010, Canada 
see Government of Canada 2010a, 2010b, Canadian Federation of 
Independent Business 2010, for the Netherlands see Deloitte 2010, Stratus 
2010, ACTAL 2011, for New Zealand see Business New Zealand-KPMG 2008, 
for Spain see Camaras 2010, for the UK see National Audit Office 2009, MORI 
2007a (survey among firms in the UK) and MORI 2007b (survey among 
citizens in the UK). 
18 Perception survey regulators Netherlands For the Netherlands, see ACTAL 2011. 
Final outcome     
19 Administrative burdens 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
The most comprehensive source for applications of the Standard Cost Model 
and measuring administrative burdens is http://www.administrative-
burdens.com/. Other studies and reports include Productivity Commission 2010 
(for Australia), Government of Canada 2010a, 2010b (for Canada), 
Government of Denmark, Rigsrevisionen 2007 and Center for Kvalitet i 
ErhvervsRegulering 2010 (for Denmark), Federal Statistical Office 2006 (for 
Germany), Regulatory Reform Group 2008, 2010 (for the Netherlands), 
Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry 2008, National Audit Office 2008a 
(for the UK), Regeringskansliet 2011 (for Sweden), and OECD 2007 (in 
general). Likewise, many surveys listed under “Perception survey citizens and 
firms" relate to measuring administrative burdens. 
20 Total number of lives saved    
21 Total cost reduction United States On the US, see Office of Management and Budget, 2009, 2010, 2011. 
 
